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THE MISSING BRANCH OF THE JURY 
SUJA A. THOMAS 
Over time, the criminal, civil, and grand juries have declined in 
power. Cost, incompetence, inaccuracy, and inefficiency are often 
cited as the reasons for this fall. Recognizing that authority that 
formerly resided in the jury has shifted to the traditional constitutional 
actors of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states, 
this Article explores a new theory for the decline of the jury. In the 
past, the Supreme Court has used the doctrines of the separation of 
powers and federalism to protect the power of the traditional actors 
including the branches, while it has not used any similar doctrine to 
preserve jury authority. At the same time, the power of the jury has 
eroded. This Article argues that the jury is effectively a “branch” of 
government—similar to the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary—that has not been recognized and protected. In many 
instances the Court originally found authority in the jury to later take 
the same authority and give it to a traditional actor. A novel study 
helps explain why the status of the jury has changed. It shows that 
legal elites and corporations appear to have influenced this shift 
against jury authority. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The American jury was derived from the vibrant late eighteenth-century 
English criminal, civil, and grand juries.1 Despite this model, juries hear few 
cases in the United States today.2 They try around 1%–4% of criminal cases in 
federal and state courts and hear less than one percent of civil cases in federal 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and 
Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1197–99 (2014). 
 2 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE C—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS (Sept. 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusin 
ess/2013/appendices/C00Sep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM9D-7BDC]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE D CASES—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS (Sept. 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/ 
appendices/D00CSep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6BX-C28Q]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, TABLE T-1—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—TRIALS JUDICIAL BUSINESS (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/T01Sep13.p
df [https://perma.cc/YR9L-WZT3]; see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An 
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 459, 507 tbl.4, 510 (2004). 
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and state courts.3 Also, grand juries do not sit in many state courts.4 Even 
when juries hear cases, judges often second-guess them, taking cases from 
them using procedures that did not exist at the time of the founding. At the 
same time that the jury has declined in authority, the “traditional constitutional 
actors” of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states have 
gained power.5 For example, under the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress permitted 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to shift more authority from juries in 
federal courts to itself.6 So, civil insider trading cases that were formerly tried 
by juries are now often tried by SEC judges.7 This shift from juries is the 
subject of several recent lawsuits.8 Similar shifts from juries to the traditional 
actors can also be seen in the criminal context.9 
Although various reasons have been offered for the jury’s decline, these 
reasons have not taken into account that the power of the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the states (the traditional actors) has risen in 
conjunction with the jury’s decline in authority. Also, the reasons do not factor 
in that no Supreme Court doctrine protects the jury’s authority while the 
traditional actors’ powers have been guarded through the court-created 
doctrines of separation of powers and federalism.  
This Article introduces a new theory accounting for the fall of the three 
juries and the related increase in authority of the traditional actors. Namely, 
the jury’s independent authority has never been recognized. The jury has never 
been given branch-like status through the use of doctrines similar to the 
separation of powers and federalism that protect the power of the traditional 
actors.  
This Article analyzes the reasons behind the decline related to the shift 
from the jury to traditional actors. It does not discuss, however, other 
phenomena, such as arbitration and settlement, that have affected the decline 
in the jury and that do not directly involve such shifts in authority from the 
jury to traditional actors. 
Understanding why the jury does not hear many cases can influence 
decisions on whether the jury should hear more cases. This Article reframes 
                                                                                                                     
 3 See Galanter, supra note 2, at 510, 512 tbl.7. 
 4 See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2 to 1-3 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 5 See generally Thomas, supra note 1 (arguing that juries play almost no role in 
government today). 
 6 See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, 
WALL STREET J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-
appoints-1413849590 [https://perma.cc/22YT-L6ZV] (last updated Oct. 21, 2014).  
 7 Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Duka v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 
WL 4940057 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015), Tilton v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 15-CV-472 
(RA), 2015 WL 4006165 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Hill v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 114 
F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 9 Thomas, supra note 1, at 1215–23. 
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the future debate over the decline of the jury to whether the traditional actors 
should hold authority that was intended for the people through the jury. 
This Article also begins to explore why the jury’s authority has not been 
protected. The jury’s inability to act on its own and protect its own authority is 
described. Next, the shift in the opinions of the Supreme Court from pro-jury 
to anti-jury in several areas over time is shown. Finally, a novel empirical 
study that studies the time period when the Court shifts its positions suggests 
why the Court overturned several pro-jury decisions, in turn indicating why 
jury authority continues to decline. 
Part I describes reasons previously offered for the declines of the criminal, 
civil, and grand juries. These reasons include cost, incompetence, inaccuracy, 
and inefficiency.  
Part II describes the new theory for the fall of the jury—that the jury has 
not been treated in a manner similar to the traditional actors of the executive, 
the legislature, the judiciary, and the states—as a separate branch-like 
constitutional actor with authority. The similarity between the constitutional 
text granting power to the traditional actors and the jury is first set forth. Next, 
the congruence between the founders’ discussion of the traditional actors and 
the jury as important components of the government whose authority must be 
protected is described. Thereafter, the disparate treatments of the traditional 
actors and the jury by the Supreme Court are shown. Specifically, the Court 
has used separation of powers and federalism to carve out particular roles for 
the traditional actors. On the other hand, the Court has failed to use similar 
doctrine to protect the jury. Instead, over time, the Court has overturned 
numerous important decisions in which the jury was first granted significant 
authority.  
This Article then explores whether the jury should be given status in the 
constitutional structure similar to the traditional actors. Part of this question 
depends on whether the founders set forth power in the jury or instead simply 
gave people a right to a jury. Justice Thomas has stated that “[t]here is some 
dispute whether the guarantee of a jury trial protects an individual right, a 
structural right, or both.”10 He reiterated his view that the jury is a 
“fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.”11  
After concluding that the jury should be considered effectively a “branch” 
of the government because of the authority granted to it under the 
Constitution, this Article further explores why the authority of the jury has 
declined. It first recognizes the unique characteristics of the jury as unable to 
protect its own authority. It goes on to analyze the time period when the 
Supreme Court made many shifts in its decisions on jury authority against jury 
authority. By using public news articles in that time period, it concludes that 
legal elites and corporations likely influenced the Court.  
                                                                                                                     
 10 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1961 n.1 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 11 Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004)). 
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This Article concludes that understanding the traditional actors’ roles in 
the jury’s fall permits a more accurate assessment of the role that the jury 
should play in the government. Looking forward, the debate about the jury’s 
decline must be reframed to consider the respective roles that the traditional 
actors and the people through the jury should play in the government. 
II. REASONS PROFFERED FOR THE FALLS OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND 
GRAND JURIES 
Commentators generally do not recognize the similarity of the reasons 
proffered for the criminal, civil, and grand juries’ declines. However, cost, 
incompetence, inaccuracy, and inefficiency are commonly touted as 
explanations for why each hears few cases, and why, even when each hears 
cases, its authority may be disregarded. This part summarizes these reasons for 
the falls of the juries. 
A. The Criminal Jury 
Much of the decline of the criminal jury in the United States is attributed 
to plea bargaining. Its systematic use is first traced to the early nineteenth 
century.12 While defendants pled to different crimes at various rates, it appears 
that they generally pled guilty only about 20% of the time.13 By the early 
twentieth century, the proportion of defendants who took pleas grew to more 
than 90%—a figure that continues to climb.14 
Different reasons have been offered for the increase in plea bargaining and 
subsequent decrease in jury trials.15 The rise in the number of plea-bargained 
cases has been associated with changing caseloads.16 As the absolute number 
of criminal defendants has increased over time—for example, doubling in the 
federal courts from 1946 to 2002—some argue that pleas have become 
necessary to dispose of cases quickly without trial.17 Faced with heavy loads, 
prosecutors and judges alike have similar incentives for promoting plea 
bargaining.18 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Warren Burger 
stated that “plea bargaining is to be encouraged because ‘[i]f every criminal 
charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal 
                                                                                                                     
 12 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 12 (2003). 
 13 Id. at 140 (drawing on statistic from the city of Boston). 
 14 Id. at 137. 
 15 See MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA 
BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY 1–13 (2005). 
 16 See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 151, 156 (2005). 
 17 See id. at 156 & n.16. 
 18 See Bruce P. Smith, Plea Bargaining and the Eclipse of the Jury, 1 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 131, 133–34 (2005). 
1266 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:6 
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and 
court facilities.’”19 Or, as John Langbein translates Burger’s sentiment, “We 
cannot afford the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Sheer expediency is 
rationale enough for disregarding the constitutional texts.”20  
Scholars have also suggested that plea bargaining substituted for jury trials 
after legislators introduced mandatory minimum sentencing and mandatory 
sentencing guidelines in the 1980s.21 Under the mandatory minimum regime, 
charges carry particular minimum sentences. The prosecutor can choose a 
charge with a lesser mandatory sentence for a defendant who foregoes a jury 
trial and accepts a plea. In such a system, defendants—even innocent ones—
have significant incentives to plead guilty and waive their jury trial right. 
When a jury decides a case, unlike in the past,22 the jury will acquit or convict 
on the charges without knowing the punishment associated with the charges. 
In these circumstances, the jury may acquit on the charges, it may give a 
verdict on the charge that comes with the greatest punishment, or it may 
convict on the charge that presents the least time in prison.23 For a variety of 
reasons, including that the jury does not know the possible sentences and the 
prosecutor may not prosecute the charge with the lesser punishment that was 
offered in plea bargaining, the defendant is unlikely to take his chance with a 
jury. 
In addition to the impact of mandatory minimums on plea bargaining, 
sentencing guidelines (although now advisory) also encourage guilty pleas.24 
Judges use these protocols to determine the baseline sentence and whether it 
should be increased or decreased. The guidelines incentivize defendants to 
take pleas by providing certain discounts to sentences—for example, 
acceptance of responsibility—that will not be available upon being convicted 
at trial. Prosecutors also can influence the effect of the guidelines in certain 
ways, including by recommending a particular sentence within the sentencing 
range or recommending a departure from that range.25 
Under another view, elected district attorneys who sought to advance 
particular political agendas in the nineteenth century caused plea bargains to 
supplant jury trials.26 The state was said to have adopted “its own social and 
                                                                                                                     
 19 John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of 
Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 125 (1992) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)); see Smith, supra note 18, at 
132.  
 20 Langbein, supra note 19, at 125. 
 21 See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, From “Rites” to “Rights”: The Decline of the Criminal 
Jury Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 433, 436–37 (2012). 
 22 Thomas, supra note 1, at 1205. 
 23 Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 375, 375–79 (2011). 
 24 See Gertner, supra note 21, at 437. 
 25 See id. 
 26 MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 15, at 327–37. 
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political agenda,” including “aggregate justice” and “certainty,” which 
encouraged pleas over jury trials.27 
Other explanations are offered for the fall of the criminal jury—among 
them emotional reactions of jury members and the expansion of jury 
membership across economic lines, sexes, and races—possibly leading to 
perceptions that juries may render verdicts in favor of criminal defendants, 
influenced by reasons unrelated to the law.28 At the same time, 
democratization of the jury simply may have led certain segments of the 
population not to desire juries any longer because of the possible results.29
 
B. The Civil Jury 
Commentators criticize the civil jury in some of the same ways as they do 
the criminal jury. Civil juries have been widely characterized as biased, and 
some say these inclinations are due to increasing diversity.30 Moreover, 
members of the general public who comprise the jury are chastised as unable 
to understand cases involving complicated issues.31 One of the most common 
explanations for why the civil jury has fallen derives in part from such 
assessments.32 It asserts that parties, such as corporations, have sought 
alternative methods of dispute resolution, particularly arbitration or settlement, 
because juries harbor bias for underdog plaintiffs and are unable to decide 
complicated cases accurately.33 
Corporations have also actively sought to limit juries’ authority when 
juries actually try cases.34 While the nature of any jury decision is 
unpredictable, proponents of jury reform argue that because juries are not held 
                                                                                                                     
 27 See id. at 336–37.  
 28 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 3–4 (1994); JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, 
ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 102–09 (2013). In addition to discussing this possible explanation, 
Robert Burns sets forth several potential reasons for the decline of the criminal and civil 
trials, including the jury trial. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 
88–108 (2009). 
 29 See Stephen C. Thaman, A Typology of Consensual Criminal Procedures: An 
Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Theory and Practice of Avoiding the Full 
Criminal Trial, in WORLD PLEA BARGAINING: CONSENSUAL PROCEDURES AND THE 
AVOIDANCE OF THE FULL CRIMINAL TRIAL 297, 327–28 (Stephen C. Thaman ed., 2010).  
 30 Hans & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 376–78. 
 31 NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 232 (2005). 
 32 Id. 
 33 See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: 
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS 
DAMAGE AWARDS (1995) (examining the role of the civil jury in medical malpractice 
lawsuits); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1263, 1266–68 (2005); Hans & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 376–
78. 
 34 Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our 
Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1254–55 (2014). 
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accountable for their decisions and can choose not to follow the law, 
corporations are subject to unacceptable uncertainty.35 Successfully 
advocating for tort reform, corporations have secured greater predictability in 
certain cases through limits on the monetary damages that juries can award.36 
In addition to the possibility of large jury verdicts being rendered against 
them, corporations and other defendants must pay attorneys’ fees, which 
increase dramatically when a matter goes to trial. Pursuant to the “so-called 
‘American rule,’” in the vast majority of cases, defendants pay their own 
attorneys’ fees even if they win at trial.37 As a result, defendants and—in 
many cases—plaintiffs are incentivized to avoid trial. 
Along with corporations and other parties seeking to avoid litigation costs, 
courts have incentives to avoid civil juries. Like their criminal caseloads, 
courts’ civil dockets have grown exponentially.38 Although some resources 
have been devoted to this growth, a perception exists that courts’ dockets 
remain overcrowded.39 There is also congressional pressure for processing 
cases in a timely manner. Congress requires federal judges to report cases 
pending for more than three years and motions pending more than six 
months.40 Under such pressure, juries, which take time and money to 
compose, may be disfavored. Judges have also actively reduced their civil 
caseloads through the use of procedures such as summary judgment that 
preclude jury trials.41  
Additionally, increased access to courts “for outsiders,” including civil 
rights plaintiffs, may have led to reform efforts, resulting in more limitations 
on claims such as caps on monetary damages.42 Legislatures have also shifted 
                                                                                                                     
 35 See Hans & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 376–78. See generally Lars Noah, Civil 
Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1601 (2001) (discussing the “debate over 
criminal jury nullification as a prelude to considering the possible arguments for and 
against its counterpart in civil litigation”).  
 36 See Whitehouse, supra note 34, at 1262–64. 
 37 John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE 
L.J. 522, 572 (2012). 
 38 ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 136 (2001). 
 39 See id. at 136–38. For a historical perspective on civil juries, see Renée Lettow 
Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 831, 848 (2014). 
 40 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 476 (1990). 
 41 See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement 
Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (2004) (arguing for 
mandatory summary judgment as a solution to the nuisance-value settlement problem); 
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984 (2003); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982). 
 42 See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated 
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 606–09 (1993). 
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matters to administrative agencies for more efficiency, uniformity, and control 
than they think juries offer.43  
As Marc Galanter has stated, the decline in the civil jury has been 
associated with  
a mutually supportive complex of beliefs and practices—beliefs that we are 
suffering from a litigation explosion; that juries are biased against corporate 
defendants; that courts should not be expanding the edges of rights; that 
litigation is hurting the economy; and that the solution is to curtail remedies, 
privatize, and deregulate.44 
In his article on the disappearance of the civil trial, John Langbein asserted 
another reason for the decline, claiming that, “Litigants no longer go to trial 
because they no longer need to.”45 Cases are tried through discovery.46 
Formerly at common law, the trial was the only method available to discover 
the facts of a case.47 After the separate courts of law and equity merged under 
the federal rules (and analogous state rules), fact-finding began to occur earlier 
when parties exchanged information before trial.48 Using this evidence and 
new procedures, judges bypassed juries by dismissing cases that they deemed 
factually insufficient, and they encouraged settlement in other cases.49 
Langbein argues that this system makes the trial unnecessary because the 
parties and courts know the facts earlier in litigation, permitting the disposition 
of cases before trial, through dismissal or settlement.50  
C. The Grand Jury 
Some early criticisms of the grand jury echo commentary on the criminal 
and civil jury regarding it as useless and inefficient.51 In the early twentieth 
century, studies concluded that grand juries simply rubberstamped 
prosecutors’ decisions to charge defendants.52 In the 1940s, and culminating in 
the 1970s, allegations emerged that prosecutors abused the powers of the 
grand jury, leading to a call for the grand jury’s abolition.53  
                                                                                                                     
 43 See SWARD, supra note 38, at 130–38. 
 44 Galanter, supra note 33, at 1272. 
 45 Langbein, supra note 37, at 569. 
 46 Id. at 570. 
 47 Id. at 569. 
 48 Id. at 570. 
 49 Id. at 570–71. 
 50 Id. at 572. 
 51 See RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1634–1941, at 60 (1963). 
 52 Id. at 229. 
 53 See MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION 
ON TRIAL 52–59, 117, 119 (1977); Michael E. Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal 
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Today, people continue to denounce grand juries for being unready to 
deviate from the direction of prosecutors. Since 1985, following the lead of the 
then-New York State Chief Judge, the grand jury has often been characterized 
as willing to “indict a ‘ham sandwich.’”54 Available statistics show 
indictments in many cases, greater than 99% of federal cases and 84%–94% of 
New York state cases, for example.55 Although these statistics can be 
interpreted in different ways, one interpretation is that the use of grand juries 
misallocates resources. Many prosecutors believe, however, that grand juries 
deliberately approach their task of judging evidence in cases and provide a 
“sounding board” regarding whether sufficient evidence to convict exists.56 
A related attack is that the grand jury is duplicative, rendering the work of 
grand juries unnecessarily costly and inefficient.57 Under this argument, 
prosecutors, police, and lawyers, all of whom played almost no role at the 
founding, are now an integral part of the system. Police and prosecutors do in 
concert what the grand jury did at common law: help to ensure that charges are 
accurate.58 Defense lawyers, provided by the state in some circumstances, 
might offer protections similar to those provided by the grand jury at common 
law.59 Judges also obviate the need for grand juries by reviewing charges at 
preliminary hearings where grand juries have not been employed.60 
Similar to criminal and civil jurors, grand jurors are often disparaged for 
their lack of qualifications and ignorance of the law.61 Commentators 
complain that grand jurors are insufficiently experienced and untrained to 
determine whether there is probable cause for the alleged crime.62 
In summary, several reasons have been offered for the declines of the 
criminal, civil, and grand juries. Their falls are associated with beliefs that 
                                                                                                                     
Grand Jury: An Instrument for the Internment of Political Activists, 75 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1159, 1176–83 (1984). 
 54 In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stewart, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1989) 
(quoting Chief Judge). 
 55 Andrew D. Leipold, Prosecutorial Charging Practices and Grand Jury Screening: 
Some Empirical Observations, in GRAND JURY 2.0, at 195, 196 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. 
ed., 2011); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in 
the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 31–39 (2002). 
 56 James C. McKinley Jr. & Al Baker, Grand Jury System, with Exceptions, Favors 
the Police in Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/n 
yregion/grand-juries-seldom-charge-police-officers-in-fatal-actions.html?_r=0 [https://per 
ma.cc/VM6V-JFHT].  
 57 See YOUNGER, supra note 51, at 145–46; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury 
Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 341–45 (2010). 
 58 Fairfax, supra note 57, at 345. 
 59 Id. at 344–45. 
 60 Id. at 345, n.33. 
 61 See YOUNGER, supra note 51, at 66, 69, 141; Simmons, supra note 55, at 69.  
 62 See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the 
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 294–304 (1995).  
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juries cannot reach nonbiased, accurate decisions, and that they take too much 
time and money to constitute when better alternatives exist. 
III. A NEW THEORY FOR THE FALL OF THE JURIES 
Despite the repeated themes of cost, incompetence, inaccuracy, and 
inefficiency, the jury occupies a prominent role in the Constitution in the 
original text and three different Amendments.63 So, the fall of the jury remains 
puzzling. Even if costly, incompetent, inaccurate, and inefficient, the jury is 
constitutionally required.64 The executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and 
the states have also been criticized as being costly, incompetent, inaccurate, 
and inefficient65—but have not declined in use like the jury has. Nor have 
those actors been disparaged as useless. And arguments for their abolishment 
have not enjoyed serious consideration.66 At the same time, these actors have 
taken substantial authority from the criminal, civil, and grand juries. Why have 
these similarly-criticized other actors reaped power while the jury has 
declined? 
To understand the fall of the jury and the continued rise of the executive, 
the legislature, the judiciary, and the states, we need to examine the 
relationships between the jury and the other actors, as well as the 
characteristics of each. Several features distinguish the jury. The first, which is 
the focus of the following section, concerns the treatment of the jury in 
relation to the other actors in the Constitution. It has been subjugated to a 
place of unequal footing with them. The other features, which are addressed at 
the end of this Article, concern the inability of the jury to act on its own.  
A. The Other Branch 
The text of the Constitution, in addition to evidence at the founding and at 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, reveals commonalities among 
the roles that the jury, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the 
states were to play. These bodies were constituted as separate, independent, 
powerful, and interrelated actors. However, the nonjury actors, led by the 
Supreme Court, have recognized only their own separate powers and 
                                                                                                                     
 63 U.S. CONST. art. III; id. amends. V, VI, VII. 
 64 Id. art. III, § 2. 
 65 See Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A 
Dynamic Analysis, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 118, 118–20 (2007); cf. Charles M. Blow, The Do-
Even-Less Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opi 
nion/charles-blow-the-do-even-less-congress.html [https://perma.cc/AR26-QZCB] (citing 
research on the declining number of laws enacted by Congress, mentioning little veto of 
laws by the President, and stating that Congress is sitting for fewer days than in the past). 
 66 See WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS, 
TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2002). 
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independence. They have denied the jury’s similar authority, and instead, have 
almost invariably appropriated its powers. 
1. The Constitutional Text 
An examination of the constitutional text reveals that the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary, the states, the criminal jury, the civil jury, and the 
grand jury similarly all have powers and limitations as well as 
interdependences. 
a. The Executive 
Article II establishes the powers and limitations of the executive.67 For 
example, the President can pardon defendants convicted of federal offenses, 
but cannot do so in impeachment cases.68 The President can make treaties, but 
only with the advice and consent of the Senate.69 The President can also 
appoint Supreme Court Justices and all other officers of the United States, but 
also only with the advice and consent of the Senate.70 As a final example, the 
President is empowered to fill all vacancies that occur during the recess of the 
Senate.71 However, these commissions are limited as they expire at the end of 
the next session of the Senate.72  
b. The Legislature 
Similar to Article II, Article I establishes the powers and limitations of the 
legislature.73 Such powers include the Senate’s authority to try all 
impeachments.74 The legislature can enact laws on only certain subjects and is 
explicitly prohibited from passing a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.75 A 
majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate must approve a bill, 
and the President must sign it in order for the bill to become law.76 Without 
presidential approval, two-thirds of each of the House of Representatives and 
Senate must approve the bill for it to become law.77  
                                                                                                                     
 67 U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 68 Id. art. II, § 2. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id.  
 73 U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 74 Id. art. I, § 3. 
 75 Id. art. I, § 9. 
 76 Id. art. I, § 7. 
 77 Id. 
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c. The Judiciary 
Most of the express powers and limitations of the judiciary are established 
by Article III.78 Under this Article, judges hold their offices unless they have 
acted unlawfully, and Congress cannot decrease their compensation during 
their time in office.79 Moreover, Article III gives the judiciary jurisdiction over 
all cases in law and equity that arise under the Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and treaties.80 Among other powers, it has authority over 
controversies between citizens of different states.81 Article III also limits the 
power of the judiciary by giving a different body—the jury—power to try all 
crimes except impeachment cases.82 
d. The States 
Article IV and the Tenth Amendment establish the powers and limitations 
of the states.83 Article IV guarantees that the acts of each state will be 
recognized by the other states,84 and the Tenth Amendment broadly grants 
power to states.85 It gives those powers not granted to the United States and 
those that the states are not prohibited from possessing to the states or the 
people.86 Under Article I, states also can take certain actions such as imposing 
duties on imports or exports upon the consent of Congress.87 
e. The Criminal Jury 
Article III and the Sixth Amendment establish the powers and limitations 
of the criminal jury.88 Article III provides a jury trial for all crimes except 
impeachment cases.89 Additionally, the Sixth Amendment grants that a person 
accused of a crime has rights associated with the jury trial, including an 
impartial jury.90 No other constitutional provisions further explicitly limit the 
criminal jury.91 For example, under the previously mentioned articles and 
                                                                                                                     
 78 Id. art. III. 
 79 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 80 Id. art. III, § 2. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. art. IV; id. amend. X. 
 84 Id. art. IV, § 1. 
 85 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 86 Id. art. IV; id. amend. X. 
 87 Id. art. I, § 10. 
 88 Id. art. III; id. amend. VI. 
 89 Id. art. III, § 2. 
 90 Id. amend. VI. 
 91 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury . . . .”); id. amend. VI. 
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amendments, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states possess 
no express authority over the criminal jury.  
f. The Civil Jury 
The Seventh Amendment establishes the authority of the civil jury.92 It 
“preserved” the right to a jury trial in “[s]uits at common law” where the 
amount in dispute is more than twenty dollars and grants the judiciary limited 
authority to re-examine facts tried by a jury “according to the rules of the 
common law.”93 Pursuant to the Amendment, then, in cases above twenty 
dollars, the right to a jury trial at common law is preserved. Moreover, the 
judiciary is given express common law authority over facts tried by a civil 
jury.94 Other than this common law authority, the executive, the legislature, the 
judiciary, and the states have no other explicit constitutional authority over the 
civil jury.  
g. The Grand Jury 
The Fifth Amendment establishes the grand jury requirement.95 With the 
exception of some cases that involve the military or state militia, it provides 
that a grand jury must present or indict in order for a person to be prosecuted 
“for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime.”96 Thus, the grand jury has almost 
exclusive authority to initiate prosecutions for serious crimes.97 
 
In summary, in the constitutional text, specific authority is granted to the 
executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the states, the criminal jury, the civil 
jury, and the grand jury. Moreover, limitations are placed on all of those 
actors, often in relationship to one another. 
2. The Founders and Ratifiers 
In addition to the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has utilized 
evidence from the founding to limit the authority of the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the states in relationship to each other. It has not 
                                                                                                                     
 92 Id. amend. VII. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”).  
 95 Id. amend. V. 
 96 Id. 
 97 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger . . . .”); id. art. I, § 8, cls. 14, 16. 
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similarly acted to limit their power in relationship to the jury. This section 
shows that the Supreme Court has used such founding evidence to support 
employing the doctrines of separation of powers to protect the powers of the 
executive, the legislature, and the judiciary and the concept of federalism to 
protect the authority of the federal government and the states. At the same 
time, the Court has refused to use a similar doctrine to limit the authority of 
the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states in relationship to the 
jury. 
a. On the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States 
The founders extolled the distinct responsibilities of the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the states and those actors’ powers to keep one 
another in check.98 These checks and balances were necessary to maintain 
each actor’s independence.99 Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, James 
Madison stated, “If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the 
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately exercised; it is 
equally so that they be independently exercised.”100 At that time, George 
Mason also stated that the three departments should “be kept as separate as 
possible.”101 
After the Constitution was adopted, writing about the importance of the 
division of the powers of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary in 
The Federalist, James Madison stated that, “The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, 
or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”102 “[T]he fundamental principles 
of a free constitution [would be] subverted” if one department exercised all of 
the power of another department.103 Madison emphasized that limits must be 
imposed on the powers of these departments vis-à-vis the others.104 
Accordingly, “none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an 
overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective 
powers. It will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and that it 
ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.”105 
Additionally, the independence of the departments was emphasized:  
                                                                                                                     
 98 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 56 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]; see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard 
of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2001). 
 99 Clark, supra note 98, at 1328. 
 100 RECORDS, supra note 98, at 56. 
 101 Id. at 537.  
 102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 103 Id. at 303. 
 104 Id. 
 105 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 102, at 308 (James Madison). 
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In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of 
the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on 
all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each 
department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so 
constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible 
in the appointment of the members of the others.106 
The mutual interrelationships made the division of their powers possible. 
As Madison stated, “[T]he defect must be supplied, by so contriving the 
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, 
by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper 
places.”107 Madison illustrated these significant interrelationships: 
The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself 
make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice 
in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The 
judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the 
executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised by 
the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, 
though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed 
from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial 
power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no 
executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme 
executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and 
condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department.108 
The founders focused on the relationships between the departments 
because of their potential to overreach.109 At the federal convention, Governor 
Morris discussed the need for a “check” on the legislature, which posed the 
“greater danger” to “public liberty” than any other department.110 Executive 
power was also feared.111 George Mason discussed how it could turn into a 
“Monarchy.”112 Elbridge Gerry made similar comments about the judiciary, 
claiming it could be “oppressive.”113 
Similar to their discussion of this division of authority, the Founders 
examined the distinct powers of the states and the federal government in the 
governmental structure, although there was clear disagreement on the subject. 
“[I]t is widely recognized that ‘The Federalist reads with a split personality’ on 
                                                                                                                     
 106 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 102, at 321 (James Madison). 
 107 Id. at 320.  
 108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 102, at 303 (James Madison).  
 109 Id. 
 110 RECORDS, supra note 98, at 75–76. 
 111 Id. at 35. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Letter from Elbridge Gerry to the Legislature (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 6, 6–7 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
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matters of federalism.”114 As a general matter, Hamilton was very nationalistic 
in his interpretation of the Constitution, and Madison interpreted the powers of 
the states more broadly.115  
Regardless of this difference, Hamilton and Madison agreed that divisions 
of power between the federal government and the states existed. When 
Hamilton discussed power held by the states, he emphasized corresponding 
constitutional limitations on the federal government’s power. “[A]n attempt on 
the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it would 
be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its 
Constitution.”116 He emphasized that states would retain powers that they 
possessed before the Constitution was enacted, as the states were limited in 
their authority only  
where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the 
Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in 
another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it 
granted an authority to the Union to which a similar authority in the States 
would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.117  
Consistent with the notion of the limited power of the Union, Madison 
stated, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.”118 The power of the states 
included the aspects of “the ordinary course of affairs . . . and the internal 
order” of the state.119 And the states’ powers were greatest in “times of peace 
and security,” whereas the power of the federal government was primarily 
limited to externalities with its most extensive power in the rare events “of 
war and danger.”120  
Madison discussed “the disposition and the faculty [the federal and state 
governments] may respectively possess to resist and frustrate the measures of 
each other.”121 The natural emphasis on local interest would serve as a check 
on the power of the federal government because the officers would retain 
concerns about their own states.122 Also, if the federal government encroached 
on the states, the states would unite against the federal government.123 
                                                                                                                     
 114 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 916 n.9 (1997) (quoting D. BRAVEMAN ET 
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 198–99 (3d 
ed. 1996)).  
 115 See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 102, at 292 (James Madison).  
 116 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 102, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 117 Id. 
 118 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 102, at 292 (James Madison). 
 119 Id. at 293. 
 120 Id.  
 121 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 102, at 295 (James Madison). 
 122 See id. at 296. 
 123 See id. at 294–300.  
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b. On the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries 
As described above, the founders of the Constitution emphasized the 
important interrelationships among the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary, as well as each actor’s independence. The significant connection 
between the federal government and the states was also stressed along with 
their independence from one another. The Constitution’s founders and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers similarly discussed the interrelationships 
between the jury and these other actors. The founders and the ratifiers also 
understood that the American jury had an independent role like the executive, 
the legislature, the judiciary, and the states—specifically to protect against 
actions by those other actors. 
Early on, people who favored a greater role for states (Anti-Federalists) 
expressed concern about the continued vitality of the jury’s role because of the 
constitutional power over law and fact granted to the Supreme Court on 
appeal.124 During this same period, Thomas Jefferson extensively discussed 
the importance of the people in every part of the government, including 
through the jury. The people elected the President, they selected legislators, 
and juries checked the judiciary. For example, juries could counter possible 
judicial bias:  
[W]e all know that permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps; that being 
known, they are liable to be tempted by bribery; that they are misled by favor, 
by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the executive or 
legislative power; that it is better to leave a cause to the decision of cross and 
pile, than to that of a judge biased to one side; and that the opinion of twelve 
honest jurymen gives still a better hope of right, than cross and pile does.125 
Jefferson emphasized the power that the jury held in relationship to the 
judge—that a jury could decide the law in addition to the facts where the 
jurors believed the judge was biased.126  
Similarly, James Wilson discussed the division of authority between 
judges and jurors. Recognizing the possibility that issues of law and fact 
sometimes intermix, he stated that in such circumstances juries must decide 
both the law and fact.127 The Federal Farmer—an Anti-Federalist who wrote 
anonymously about the proposed Constitution—citing the support of English 
legal commentators Edward Coke, Matthew Hale, Sir John Holt, Blackstone, 
                                                                                                                     
 124 See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 289, 295 (1966). 
 125 THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 62 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939). 
 126 See id.; see also Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. XV (Jan. 
18, 1788) [hereinafter Letters from the Federal Farmer] (explaining that in civil law, where 
there are no juries, judges are “often corrupted by ministerial influence, or by parties”), 
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 113, at 315, 321. 
 127 See 2 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1000–01 (Kermit L. 
Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).  
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and Jean Louis De Lolme—acknowledged the civil jury’s power specifically 
to determine both fact and law, including through a general verdict.128 More 
generally, emphasizing the importance of the jury’s possible role as law-
finder, Jefferson stated that if people were to be excluded from a governmental 
department, it would be better that the people be left out of the legislature 
because “[t]he execution of the laws [of which the jury plays a role] is more 
important than the making” of the laws.129 Referring to the jury as “the 
democratic branch of the judiciary power,” the Maryland Farmer, another 
Anti-Federalist, agreed that the jury was more important than people in the 
legislature.130  
John Adams also addressed the role of the jury as a check on the judiciary 
and compared its role in government to the legislature: 
As the constitution requires that the popular branch of the legislature should 
have an absolute check, so as to put a peremptory negative upon every act of 
the government, it requires that the common people, should have as complete 
a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of judicature.
131
 
Alexander Hamilton also discussed the interrelationship between the jury 
and the judiciary.132 He described the civil jury as “a security against 
corruption” of judges.133 Hamilton further explained the importance of the 
dual existence of the judiciary and the civil jury to the integrity of both 
institutions.134 He called the judiciary and the civil jury 
a double security; and it will readily be perceived that this complicated 
agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions. By increasing the 
obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either. 
The temptations to prostitution which the judges might have to surmount 
must certainly be much fewer, while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, 
than they might be if they had themselves the exclusive determination of all 
causes.135 
Hamilton also discussed the necessity of the criminal jury in light of possible 
judicial wrongdoing. He described fear of “judicial despotism” through the use 
                                                                                                                     
 128 See Letters from the Federal Farmer, supra note 126, at 319–20.  
 129 3 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, 
Townsend MacCoun 1884) (appearing to discuss both the criminal and civil juries).  
 130 Essays by a Farmer No. IV (Mar. 21, 1788) [hereinafter Essays by a Farmer], 
reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 113, at 36, 38. 
 131 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. 1865). 
 132 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 102, at 499–501 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 133 Id. at 500. 
 134 See id. at 499–501. 
 135 Id. at 501. 
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of “arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary 
punishments upon arbitrary convictions.”136  
In addition to addressing the division of authority between the jury and the 
judiciary, the founders considered the relationship between the legislature and 
the jury. Those discussions reveal that the legislature was to hold no power 
over the jury beyond those expressly stated in the text of the Constitution. 
Thomas Jefferson insisted that the jury should remain separate and 
independent from the legislature.137 He stressed that the civil jury should be 
constitutionalized because the legislature should not be able to alter this 
institution that had helped secure the freedom to think and act, freedom with 
which the government had interfered.138 Alexander Hamilton recognized that 
if a civil jury trial provision were not enacted, the legislature would be free to 
establish a jury trial or not to do so.139 He further acknowledged that by the 
creation of the jury trial in criminal cases, the legislature’s 
“discretion . . . [was] abridged.”140 This quote suggests Hamilton’s belief that 
if the founders established a jury trial in the Constitution, the legislature would 
have no authority over it. Along similar lines, James Monroe affirmatively 
stated that the civil jury should be constitutionally established to prevent the 
legislature from abolishing it.141 And George Mason discussed the need for 
constitutional inclusion of the civil jury, because otherwise Congress could 
have as much influence as it desired on the decisions of the jury.142  
In proposing the civil jury right’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights, Madison 
discussed that, while the English’s declaration of rights had not limited the 
legislature, “a different opinion prevail[ed] in the United States” on whether 
the legislature and other parts of the government could be trusted.143 He 
highlighted why many states that had proposed constitutional amendments or 
made declarations for certain rights, including the jury right:  
[T]he great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, 
by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the Government 
ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode. They point these 
                                                                                                                     
 136 Id. at 499. At the Philadelphia Convention, Mr. Gerry, a delegate, said juries were 
necessary “to guard agst. corrupt Judges.” RECORDS, supra note 98, at 587. 
 137 THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 125, at 14, 47. 
 138 Id. 
 139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 102, at 496–97 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 140 Id. 
 141 See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 217–18 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 
2d ed. 1891). 
 142 See id. at 431; see also Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the 
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653, 707 n.186 (1973) (“The effort [to pass the 
Amendment] was quite clearly to require juries to sit in civil cases as a check on what the 
popular mind might regard as legislative as well as judicial excesses.”). 
 143 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1028–29 
(Leon Friedman et al. eds., 1971). 
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exceptions sometimes against the abuse of the executive power, sometimes 
against the legislative, and, in some cases, against the community itself; or, in 
other words, against the majority in favor of the minority.144 
Madison further described the trial by jury as “a right resulting from a social 
compact which regulates the action of the community,” and stated it was “as 
essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights 
of nature.”145 
The founders also understood the civil jury to provide a mechanism by 
which laws could be nullified. For example, “paper money and British debt 
claims were the most prominently discussed civil jury trial issues during the 
ratification debates.”146 Juries gave debtors relief against the suits by creditors, 
whose claims may have been inflated due to the past excessive printing of 
currency by states.147  
Similar to the founders’ discussion about the relationship between the civil 
jury and the legislature, the interdependency between the criminal jury and the 
legislature was discussed. Addressing the constitutionally established criminal 
jury, James Wilson emphasized the jury’s existing power to pass judgment on 
criminal defendants and the related lack of power of the federal legislature to 
find people guilty of crimes through acts of attainder for treason or felony.148  
The jury also provided a buffer between the executive and the people. The 
Declaration of Independence had described King George III as “depriving us, 
in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury.”149 So the significance of the 
jury derived in part from possible abuses of the executive. James Wilson had 
recognized “the oppression of government is effectually barred, by declaring 
that in all criminal cases, the trial by jury shall be preserved.”150 The history of 
the use of sedition laws appears to have motivated the founders, as the Crown 
had attempted to prosecute people, including Peter Zenger, for publishing 
material critical of the government.151 American juries checked the executive 
by refusing to convict under these laws.152 Juries also curbed the legislature by 
“virtually repeal[ing]” the law, and restrained the legislature and executive by 
not convicting defendants under other English trade and revenue laws.153  
Civil juries were also expected to check the government. Discussing an 
improper search by a constable and a rendering of monetary damages by a jury 
                                                                                                                     
 144 Id. at 1029. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Wolfram, supra note 142, at 705. 
 147 See id. at 673–705.  
 148 See 2 WILSON, supra note 127, at 1009. 
 149 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).  
 150 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 157 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., Da Capo Press 1968) (1888). 
 151 See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 23–24 (2003). 
 152 Id. at 24. 
 153 Id. 
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against the government, Anti-Federalists recognized the civil jury was 
necessary in suits against the government.154  
The grand jury served as another check on the executive. Discussing it, 
James Wilson stated, “In the annals of the world, there cannot be found an 
institution so well fitted for avoiding abuses, which might otherwise arise from 
malice, from rigour, from negligence, or from partiality, in the prosecution of 
crimes.”155 He also said, “They are not appointed for the prosecutor or for the 
court: they are appointed for the government and for the people . . . .”156 
Moreover, “All the operations of government, and of its ministers and officers, 
[were] within the compass of their view and research.”157 The Zenger case 
illustrates the grand jury’s check on the executive. There, the colonial grand 
jury had refused to indict when the Crown acted against Zenger for his 
criticism of it.158  
The founders warned of the possible shift in authority if the jury were to 
lose power. Indeed, the Maryland Farmer appeared to predict our present state 
of affairs regarding plea bargaining. He stated that with the elimination of 
juries, “The judiciary power is immediately absorbed, or placed under the 
direction of the executive . . . . Thus we find the judiciary and executive 
branches united, or the former totally dependent on the latter in most of the 
governments in the world.”159 
In addition to the founders’ more specific statements about jury authority 
in relationship to the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, general 
language was also used to discuss the value of an independent jury to the 
government. Thomas Jefferson described “Trial by jury . . . as the only anchor 
ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the 
principles of its constitution.”160 After the establishment of the civil and 
criminal jury trials, Jefferson named the jury trial among the “essential 
principles” of the government.161 James Wilson stated that the jury, “this 
beautiful and sublime effect of our judicial system,” promoted the principles of 
“an habitual courage, and dignity, and independence of sentiment and of 
actions in the citizens,” which he thought “should be the aim of every wise and 
good government.”162 He further acclaimed that “within its walls, strong and 
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lofty as well as finely proportioned, freedom enjoys protection, and innocence 
rests secure.”163 Also, Hamilton believed that the criminal jury trial was “a 
valuable safeguard to liberty,” while others more strongly considered it “the 
very palladium of free government.”164  
While recognizing the necessity of the jury to the Constitution, the 
founders also acknowledged that the jury was not infallible. Thomas Jefferson 
conceded that the jury could do wrong, but he insisted that more wrong would 
be done without it.165 Similarly, James Wilson accepted that juries made 
mistakes, but asserted that such mistakes could “never grow into a dangerous 
system.”166 Indeed, a jury’s mistakes generally could be corrected.167 If a 
grand jury indicted, a criminal jury might not convict.168 Even if the criminal 
jury convicted, a judge could order a new trial before a new jury.169 Also, 
mistakes could be avoided by the dismissal of jurors who showed bias against 
the defendant.170 Moreover, if a grand jury did not indict, another grand jury 
might still indict the defendant.171 Wilson emphasized the importance of this 
power to prevent or correct error, but also knew that regardless of the 
possibility of mistakes, the jury—not another tribunal—was the best body to 
decide cases.172  
Along with the founders viewing the jury as protection against the 
executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, the ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment saw the jury as an important safeguard against the states. Various 
people involved in the ratification discussed the importance of the first eight 
rights in the Bill of Rights, which included the criminal, civil, and grand juries. 
Representative Rogers stated that privileges in the Fourteenth Amendment that 
the states could not abridge included “[t]he right to be a juror.”173 
Representative Bingham also asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment actually 
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corrected for previous violations by the states of the rights that resided in the 
Bill of Rights.174 
 
In summary, the founders recognized significant divisions of authority 
between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states, along with 
their independent governmental roles. The founders of the Constitution and the 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment also acknowledged similar divisions of 
authority between the jury and the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and 
the states. Moreover, they understood the criminal, civil, and grand juries’ 
independent roles. The jury and the other actors were related, and the founders 
and the ratifiers intended that the jury play an important role to check the 
powers of those actors.  
3. The Interpretation of Power 
As shown above, the constitutional text that establishes the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the states is similar to the constitutional text that 
creates the criminal, civil, and grand juries. Both grant power to those actors 
while simultaneously limiting their authority. Also, as previously discussed, 
the founders spoke about the relationships among the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the states, as well as their respective powers, 
very much like the founders and the Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers 
expressed the relationships between the jury and those same actors as well as 
their particular powers. Although all of this—the constitutional text, evidence 
from the founding, and evidence at the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—
suggests that the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states 
(referred to here as “the traditional constitutional actors” or “traditional 
actors”) should interpret the jury’s authority in the same manner as they 
interpret each other’s powers, the traditional actors have not done so. They 
have subjugated the jury while recognizing significant power in each other. 
Using Supreme Court case law, the following section first explores the 
authority that the traditional actors have recognized in each other and next 
explains how the traditional actors have failed to acknowledge the jury’s 
authority. Because the Court exercises final decisionmaking authority, and 
case law is the primary evidence of the interaction among the traditional actors 
as well as the interrelationship between the traditional actors and the jury, this 
case law is used to illustrate the respective, disparate treatments of the 
traditional actors and the jury. 
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a. The Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States Under 
Separation of Powers and Federalism 
Scholars and the courts regularly describe the traditional actors—
excluding the states—as “[b]ranches.”175 The traditional actors, along with the 
states, are also often depicted as “constitutional actor[s].”176 These terms of 
“branch” and “constitutional actor” denote bodies that possess authority 
delegated by or recognized under the Constitution. These powers of the 
executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states are said to derive from 
different sources. They hold power that originated with the adoption of the 
Constitution. They are formally granted power that they possessed prior to the 
Constitution’s adoption. Or they are acknowledged as having certain authority 
not specifically bestowed by the Constitution. The executive, the legislature, 
the judiciary, and the states all have such constitutional authority thereby 
delegated to, or recognized in, them.  
The importance of the traditional actors as branches and constitutional 
actors has been recognized through the doctrines of separation of powers and 
federalism. Separation of powers governs the boundaries between the 
executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, while federalism polices the 
division between the federal government and the states. Although the 
Constitution does not specifically refer to separation of powers or federalism, 
the Supreme Court has deployed these doctrines to empower and limit the 
traditional actors, informed by the constitutional text, as well as the founders’ 
views of the interrelationships among the traditional actors and their particular 
powers.  
An example of separation of powers is found in Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha. There, the Supreme Court pushed back 
against Congress’s effort to exert special authority against the executive 
branch.177 Through the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress permitted 
the executive to suspend alien deportations.178 However, one House of 
Congress could override the executive’s decision.179 The Supreme Court, in an 
oft-cited illustration of its exercise of separation of powers to prevent the 
aggrandizement of the power of the branches, described limited circumstances 
                                                                                                                     
 175 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409, 412 (1989); Linda D. 
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when one House could act without the other.180 It decided that Article I of the 
Constitution required both Houses of Congress to pass on legislation.181 
Adherence to these requirements constituted an essential check on the 
branches’ powers.182 The Court described separation of powers not as “an 
abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers” but as “woven into” the 
Constitution.183 “Although not ‘hermetically’ sealed from one another, the 
powers delegated to the three Branches [were] functionally identifiable.”184 
The Court insisted that, “To preserve those checks, and maintain the 
separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch 
must not be eroded.”185 The Court emphasized that the text of the Constitution 
sets forth certain requirements to check the branches’ powers and that those 
requirements could not be circumvented based on considerations such as 
convenience and efficiency that a procedure might provide.186 Here, Congress 
had attempted to cede authority from the executive, and the Supreme Court 
intervened, invoking Congress’s limited powers in particular, and separation 
of powers more generally, to maintain the branches’ intended constitutional 
balance.187 
Marbury v. Madison is another example of separation of powers, there, 
where the judiciary blocked the legislature’s attempted exertion of power over 
the executive.188 Discussing the limitations on the power of the legislature (as 
applied to the judiciary), the Court had declared 
[t]o what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation 
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those 
intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with limited 
and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons 
on whom they are imposed . . . .189  
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is another example where the 
Supreme Court deployed separation of powers to restrain one traditional actor 
in relationship to another. Here, steel companies and their employees were 
engaged in a dispute regarding the terms of a new collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA).190 The union representing the employees indicated it would 
strike when the existing CBA expired.191 Because of the need for steel in war 
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materials, the President issued an executive order that gave authority to the 
Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel companies and continue 
operations.192 Thereafter, the President notified Congress, and Congress took 
no action.193 In its decision reviewing the President’s action of seizing the 
mills, the Supreme Court emphasized that the President’s power must derive 
either from an act of Congress or the Constitution.194 No congressional act had 
been passed granting the President the power to seize the mills, and the 
Constitution did not grant the executive this authority.195 Concluding that the 
President’s action was unconstitutional and that the legislature held the power 
that the President had tried to exercise, the Court stated that, “The Founders of 
this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good 
and bad times.”196 Here, the Court again emphasized the importance to the 
government of preserving limited powers in the different branches. 
The Supreme Court has also discussed the importance of the division of, 
and limits on, the constitutional powers of the federal government and the 
states. An early example of federalism that recognized the national 
government’s power along with the states’ limitations is McCulloch v. 
Maryland. In this case, which involved Congress’s establishment of a national 
bank and the state of Maryland’s attempted taxation of the bank, the Court 
stated, “This [federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of 
enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted 
to it, would seem too apparent . . . .”197 Although the government was not 
granted express power to create a corporation, Congress possessed power to 
make laws “necessary and proper” to the execution of its powers, such as the 
power to raise revenue through a corporation.198 The key question was 
whether the state could tax the federal bank.199 The Court decided that 
although states had power to tax, granting states authority to tax the federal 
bank would empower the states to destroy the bank.200 Finding the Maryland 
law to tax the federal government unconstitutional, the Court discussed the 
limitation of state authority as related to the federal government’s power: 
The sovereignty of a State extends to every thing which exists by its own 
authority, or is introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those 
means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers 
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conferred on that body by the people of the United States? We think it 
demonstrable that it does not.201  
Thus, the Court acknowledged the federal government’s power to use means 
to execute its constitutional powers as well as the states’ inability to interfere 
with that authority.202 
The Supreme Court likewise has limited the federal government by 
holding many federal statutes unconstitutional based, at least in part, on 
violations of federalism. The trend of actively limiting the federal government 
began with New York v. United States, which involved the State of New 
York’s challenge to the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act.203 The federal statute included three incentive provisions 
designed to encourage states to enact policies to manage waste generated 
within their borders.204 The Court held that Congress possessed authority to 
use two of the incentive provisions—monetary and disposal site access—to 
encourage states to plan for this waste disposal.205 But the Court determined 
that the Act’s “take title” provision—forcing states to take ownership of 
radioactive waste if they were unable to provide appropriate disposal sites—
was invalid.206 Congress lacked authority to compel states to enact 
legislation—the practical consequence of the Act’s “take title” provision.207 
The founders had given Congress legislative authority over individuals but not 
states.208 While Congress could have required the states to choose between 
implementing their own regulatory programs and accepting a program created 
by Congress—an arrangement of “cooperative federalism”—the “take title” 
provision constituted an unconstitutional “commandeer[ing]” of state 
governments.209 The Court compared the protection under federalism to the 
protection under the separation of powers: “Just as the separation and 
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to 
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy 
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce 
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”210 Here, the Supreme Court 
recognized the particular authority held by the federal government and the 
states and the importance of federalism to the proper functioning of the 
government. 
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At times, the Supreme Court and the other traditional actors act to limit 
their own authority. The most accessible examples occur when the Supreme 
Court acts to restrain itself. The Court has developed several doctrines limiting 
the judiciary’s role under separation of powers. For example, the Court has 
defined the constitutional requirement that a federal court hear only “cases” or 
“controversies” as mandating that a plaintiff have standing, that a case is not 
moot, that a case is ripe, and that a case does not involve a political 
question.211 The Court has described these doctrines as “founded in concern 
about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic 
society.”212 
Similarly, through the federalism-based doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
the judiciary has recognized specific limits on its power in relationship to the 
states. The Supreme Court has referred to sovereign immunity “as an essential 
component of federalism.”213 Under this doctrine, the judiciary’s power to 
hear suits against states has been limited. The Court has emphasized that “each 
State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and . . . ‘“[i]t is inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent.”’”214 While federal courts may order prospective enforcement of 
federal laws against the states, sovereign immunity sets limitations on the 
power of the federal courts to order states to pay damages.215  
The other traditional actors also sometimes restrain themselves in 
relationship to competing traditional actors when they believe they do not hold 
authority. Evidence of such self-restraint is not always apparent because it 
typically involves inaction—for example, Congress not enacting a statute that 
is beyond its power. Louis Fisher has argued that Congress attempts to stay 
within its legislative boundaries. He provided the example of the legislature’s 
1789 debate over the President’s power to remove executive officials without 
legislative action.216 Another example of the self-restraint exercised by the 
traditional actors is where a legislator votes for an official or judicial nominee 
that the President has recommended because of the legislator’s view of the 
Constitution’s requirements.217 And a final example is the interpretation of the 
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states that the federal government has the power and responsibility to secure 
the borders.218  
Although separation of powers and federalism form a barrier against 
incursions on the traditional actors’ powers, these doctrines do not provide 
impenetrable boundaries. The traditional actors can intrude upon each other’s 
turf. When this happens, the actor whose authority has been infringed upon 
may have no recourse if it cannot successfully oppose the intrusion on its own 
or challenge the action in court. For example, the executive has circumvented 
the legislature in times of international crisis. The President has acted without 
Congress despite the power of Congress to declare war set forth in Article I.219 
Moreover, the Supreme Court (as a part of the federal government) has 
initially granted authority to a state and later overruled its decision in favor of 
federal power. For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, it found constitutional a federal congressional act forcing state and 
local governments to pay their employees minimum wage and overtime.220  
Despite these limitations, the Supreme Court has employed separation of 
powers and federalism to provide significant protection for the traditional 
actors to maintain their authority, and the traditional actors themselves have 
acted to restrain their own power. Moreover, the traditional actors have the 
ability to test the boundaries of their own authority even if their authority has 
been questioned by another traditional actor. A recurring example occurs in 
the context of abortion. After Roe v. Wade,221 states have continued to enact 
statutes that restrict abortion procedure that may or may not be within the 
bounds of Roe.222 While these statutes may be reviewed by the Court, the 
ability of the states to push back gives them at least temporary authority and 
also raises these issues in public fora. 
b. A Missing Constitutional Role for the Jury? 
The jury and the traditional actors hold similar roles in the Constitution. 
Just as the text of the Constitution divides and limits powers among the 
traditional actors, it divides and limits the powers of the traditional actors in 
relationship to the powers of the criminal, civil, and grand juries. Also, just as 
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the founders planned empowering and restraining lines among the traditional 
actors, the founders of the Constitution and the ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended these types of divisions and limitations to preserve the 
jury’s realm. Despite these similarities, the Supreme Court generally 
recognizes the traditional actors as branches or constitutional actors, but, as 
shown below, does not acknowledge such an authoritative role for criminal, 
civil, and grand juries. Consequently, they have not analyzed the authority of 
the criminal, civil, and grand juries under doctrines similar to separation of 
powers and federalism, which, as demonstrated above, have played a 
significant role in securing the traditional actors’ powers.  
The Supreme Court’s differing treatment of the traditional actors and the 
jury, including the deference to the traditional actors, has contributed to the 
jury’s decline. Unlike its treatment of the traditional actors, the Court has 
examined issues related to jury authority in a disjointed, piecemeal fashion that 
neither recognizes the jury as an essential part of the governmental structure in 
the Constitution nor acknowledges that it serves roles to protect against power 
grabs by the traditional actors. The Court has often initially recognized 
authority in the jury and then changed its decision to grant power instead to a 
traditional actor. A review of some of the primary cases where the Court has 
diminished the jury’s authority while it has granted power to the traditional 
actors exhibits the different treatment of the jury and the traditional actors. 
Specifically, it shows how the omission of a separation of powers and 
federalism-type doctrine from the Court’s jury jurisprudence has contributed to 
the jury’s decline.  
Although there have been substantial shifts in authority from the jury to 
other parts of the government, one area where there has been a shift in favor of 
jury power should be acknowledged first. In the last decade or so, in a series of 
decisions, the Court recognized that the jury holds authority regarding factual 
decisions related to sentencing. For example, the Court held unconstitutional 
provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act that permitted a judge—instead of a 
jury—to decide certain sentencing facts.223 In one of the decisions on the 
jury’s role in sentencing, the Court referred to the criminal jury as “a 
fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.”224 It 
emphasized that “the very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the 
Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the 
role of the jury.”225  
                                                                                                                     
 223 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 250 (2005).  
 224 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
 225 Id. at 308; cf. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1961 n.1 
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“There is some dispute whether the guarantee of a jury 
trial protects an individual right, a structural right, or both . . . . It is [however] a 
‘fundamental reservation . . . in our constitutional structure,’ meaning its violation may not 
be authorized by the consent of the individual.” (citation omitted) (quoting Blakely, 542 
U.S. at 306)). 
1292 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:6 
Outside of this sentencing area (where, by the way, there remains some 
debate on the importance of these changes) there is little recognition of the jury 
as an important part of the constitutional structure and government. The Court 
has failed to acknowledge any specific authority in the jury or any necessity to 
guard that authority. Instead, the Supreme Court permits the traditional actors 
to decide many matters instead of juries. Moreover, it ultimately has held 
constitutional almost every modern procedure before and after a jury 
deliberation that has eliminated or reduced jury authority.  
One example shows the Court initially valued the role that the grand jury 
could play against the government but changed its view over time. In the late 
nineteenth century, in Ex parte Bain, the Court considered whether a person 
could be convicted for a crime upon a grand jury’s indictment that the 
government subsequently changed without the grand jury’s consent.226 Upon 
the prosecutor’s request, the judge had changed the indictment.227 The 
Supreme Court focused on the Fifth Amendment’s language that requires a 
person not to answer for certain crimes “unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a grand jury,” and cited the common law, under which an indictment could 
not be amended.228 Despite what the Court described as the present general 
trustworthiness of the government, the Court decided that the indictment could 
not be changed in this manner.229 It quoted a previous decision and 
emphasized that the grand jury checked governmental power: 
In this country, from the popular character of our institutions, there has 
seldom been any contest between the government and the citizen which 
required the existence of the grand jury as a protection against oppressive 
action of the government. Yet the institution was adopted in this 
country . . . and is designed as a means, not only of bringing to trial persons 
accused of public offences upon just grounds, but also as a means of 
protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it comes from 
government, or be prompted by partisan passion or private enmity.230  
The Court discussed the present importance of the grand jury, including the 
possibility of bad behavior on the part of the executive: 
[I]t remains true that the grand jury is as valuable as ever in securing, in the 
language of Chief Justice Shaw in the case of Jones v. Robbins, “individual 
citizens” “from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, 
expense, and anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established 
by the presentment and indictment of a grand jury;” and “in case of high 
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offences” it “is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against 
hasty, malicious, and oppressive public prosecutions.”231 
Emphasizing the intentions of the Framers, who “had for a long time been 
absorbed in considering the arbitrary encroachments of the crown on the 
liberty of the subject, and were imbued with the common law estimate of the 
value of the grand jury as part of its system of criminal jurisprudence,” the 
Court stated that the indictment could not be changed, because a court held no 
power to hear the case except upon a grand jury’s indictment.232  
But in 2002, in United States v. Cotton, the Supreme Court overruled this 
decision.233 In Cotton, the government failed to allege in the original 
indictment the amount of the drug that influenced the ultimate sentence that 
was imposed.234 The Court insisted that the previous decision of Bain was “a 
product of an era in which this Court’s authority to review criminal 
convictions was greatly circumscribed.”235 Concepts of jurisdiction had 
changed, and a defective indictment did not prevent a court from proceeding 
against a criminal defendant.236 Emphasizing the evidence presented in the 
trial, the Court stated “[s]urely” the grand jury would have indicted on the 
amount of cocaine under these circumstances where it had indicted on the 
conspiracy.237 Moreover, the defendant did not object to the indictment at trial 
so he waived the grand jury.238 Although the Court recognized the grand jury 
“as a check on prosecutorial power,” this served as window dressing, because, 
at the same time, it shifted power to the courts and the executive.239 
The ability of a judge to try a criminal case, a power absent from the 
Constitution, is another power about which the Court changed its mind and 
transferred authority from the jury to the judiciary. In the late nineteenth 
century, in Thompson v. Utah, the Supreme Court originally determined that a 
defendant could not waive the required trial of twelve jurors.240 There, quoting 
an earlier case that cited Blackstone and emphasizing that the jury was the 
mechanism by which a criminal defendant was to be tried under the 
Constitution, the Court decided the Constitution required a unanimous jury of 
twelve:241 
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The natural life, says Blackstone, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed 
by any individual, neither by the person himself, nor by any other of his 
fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority. The public has an interest 
in his life and liberty. Neither can be lawfully taken except in the mode 
prescribed by law.242 
Later, in Patton v. United States, a case considering, among other 
questions, whether a judge could try a case instead of a jury, the Court rejected 
that the jury constituted a fundamental part of the governmental structure. 
Examining the question, “Is the effect of the constitutional provisions in 
respect of trial by jury to establish a tribunal as a part of the frame of 
government, or only to guaranty to the accused the right to such a trial?” the 
Court dismissed any notion that history supported a role for the jury as a part 
of the constitutional structure:243  
The record of English and colonial jurisprudence antedating the 
Constitution will be searched in vain for evidence that trial by jury in criminal 
cases was regarded as a part of the structure of government, as distinguished 
from a right or privilege of the accused. On the contrary, it uniformly was 
regarded as a valuable privilege bestowed upon the person accused of crime 
for the purpose of safeguarding him against the oppressive power of the King 
and the arbitrary or partial judgment of the court.244 
After accepting that the jury trial was nothing more than a right that a 
defendant could exercise, the Court decided that judges had authority to try 
defendants through Congress’s creation of the district courts.245 In permitting 
judges to try cases instead of juries, the Court acted differently from how it 
had acted with respect to the traditional actors. Although the Constitution 
specifically gave certain types of cases to juries and judges, the Court ignored 
this text. It also failed to recognize Blackstone’s express warnings about trial 
by judge. Moreover, the Court did not acknowledge that the jury could not 
check the government if the government itself, through the judge, decided the 
case. Finally, the Court failed to recognize its own interest in the case. In 
contrast to its treatment of the traditional actors, perceiving them as mutual 
checks in the government, the Court took power from the jury and placed it in 
its own hands without any appreciation for the check that the jury was to play 
with respect to the judiciary.  
More than trials by judges, plea bargaining is a primary reason cited for 
the decline of criminal jury trials.246 Although the Supreme Court has not 
thoroughly evaluated the constitutionality of plea bargaining, it officially 
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legitimized it in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.247 In doing so, it again ignored the 
constitutional text and historical evidence that it has recognized when it has 
granted power to the traditional actors. There, the prosecutor offered the 
defendant five years of the possible sentence of two to ten years to plead guilty 
to the indicted offense.248 The State simultaneously informed the defendant 
that it would seek an indictment for a crime that could result in defendant’s life 
imprisonment if the defendant insisted on a jury trial and refused to plead 
guilty.249 When the defendant refused to take the plea, the prosecutor obtained 
an indictment on the new charge.250 A jury then convicted the defendant on 
this charge, resulting in life imprisonment.251 
The defendant argued that the action of the prosecutor to seek this other 
charge as punishment for the defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial 
was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.252 The court of appeals decided that the prosecutor had acted 
vindictively to punish the defendant for exercising his right to a jury trial and 
invalidated the subsequent charge and conviction under the Due Process 
Clause.253 Reviewing the decision, the Supreme Court emphasized “that the 
guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components 
of this country’s criminal justice system.”254 Finding no constitutional 
infirmity with the prosecutor’s action, the Court stated, “It follows that, by 
tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily 
accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s 
interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to 
plead not guilty.”255 The Court failed to discuss the Article III criminal jury 
power and the Sixth Amendment and any possible role of the jury as a check 
on the government. Instead, it prioritized the executive’s interest and did not 
consider the constitutional text and historical evidence that it had considered 
when it granted power to the traditional actors in other cases.256  
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The Supreme Court also has treated the civil jury differently than the 
traditional actors. Again, the jury’s diminution has occurred after the Court 
previously recognized jury authority. In the early twentieth century, in Slocum 
v. New York Life Insurance Co., the Court considered whether after a jury 
verdict in a civil case, a judge could decide that the evidence was insufficient, 
reverse the verdict, and direct a judgment for the side that had lost before the 
jury.257 During the trial, after all of the evidence was presented, the court had 
denied the defendant’s request that the court direct a verdict in its favor.258 
After the jury found for the plaintiff, the court of appeals later reversed and 
found for the defendant.259 The Supreme Court acknowledged that it must 
examine the English common law to determine the meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment.260 At common law, another jury trial was the only method by 
which the determination of the first jury could be re-examined.261 Deciding 
that the court of appeals acted improperly when it circumvented the jury in 
ruling in the defendant’s favor, the Court emphasized the importance of both 
the judge and the jury and the relationship between them: 
In the trial by jury, the right to which is secured by the Seventh 
Amendment, both the court and the jury are essential factors. To the former is 
committed a power of direction and superintendence, and to the latter the 
ultimate determination of the issues of fact. Only through the coöperation of 
the two, each acting within its appropriate sphere, can the constitutional right 
be satisfied. And so, to dispense with either or to permit one to disregard the 
province of the other is to impinge on that right.262 
In its decision, the Court distinguished the demurrer to the evidence and the 
nonsuit, procedures at common law in England that differed from the 
procedure employed by the appellate court.263 
Just over twenty years later, in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. 
Redman, however, the Court took a different view of the roles of the judiciary 
and the jury. In that case, after evidence was presented at trial, the defense 
asked the judge to decide in its favor on the basis that the plaintiff had not 
presented sufficient evidence in support of his case.264 The court deferred 
consideration of the motion, and after a jury verdict for the plaintiff, decided 
that the evidence in favor of the plaintiff was sufficient.265 The court of 
appeals determined differently that the evidence was insufficient, ordered a 
                                                                                                                     
 257 Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 369 (1913). 
 258 Id. at 368. 
 259 Id. at 369. 
 260 Id. at 377. 
 261 Id. at 377–78. 
 262 Id. at 382. 
 263 See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 388–98. 
 264 Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935). 
 265 Id. 
2016] MISSING BRANCH OF THE JURY 1297 
new trial, and cited Slocum in support of its decision.266 Reviewing the 
decision of the court of appeals to order a new trial instead of a judgment for 
the defendant, the Supreme Court first recognized that the Amendment was “to 
retain the common-law distinction between the province of the court and that 
of the jury,” including that “issues of law are to be resolved by the court and 
issues of fact are to be determined by the jury.”267 It went on to take authority 
from the jury by incorrectly characterizing the sufficiency of the evidence as a 
common law issue of law that it could decide.268 It attempted to distinguish 
Slocum on the ground that the issue of the insufficiency of the evidence was 
not reserved for the lower court before the case was sent to the jury and 
claimed that the court of appeals in this case employed a practice similar to the 
common law practice, whereby such issues of law could be reserved for the 
court during trial.269 The Supreme Court concluded that a judge could decide 
the opposite of what the jury decided.270 Where the jury had found for one 
party, the judge could later dismiss the case in favor of the other party without 
ordering a new jury trial.271 According to the Court, parts of Slocum went 
beyond the proper confines of the case and therefore did not apply, and in any 
event, the Redman decision “qualified” its holding in Slocum.272  
The final case that shifted significant authority to the judge from the civil 
jury was decided soon after Redman. In Galloway v. United States, after the 
parties presented evidence at trial, the trial court decided that the evidence was 
“legally insufficient” and ruled in favor of the government.273 The Supreme 
Court considered the question of whether a judge could decide that the 
evidence was insufficient at trial and find for one party without sending the 
case to a jury.274 Deciding that the procedure did not violate the Seventh 
Amendment, the Court also stated that, “The objection therefore [came] too 
late.”275 This argument was “foreclosed by repeated decisions made [in the 
Court] consistently for nearly a century,” and the “approv[al] explicitly in the 
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”276 Despite its previous 
statement in Redman about the authority of the jury to find fact, the Court 
asserted that, “The jury was not absolute master of fact in 1791,” and it cited 
the demurrer to the evidence and the new trial in support of this assertion.277 
Moreover, not acknowledging its prior statements about the demurrer to 
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evidence in Slocum, the Court attempted to favorably compare the directed 
verdict—the present procedure—to the demurrer to the evidence.278 It also 
discussed how the Seventh Amendment did not tie the judiciary to any specific 
procedure that occurred at the time of the adoption of the Seventh 
Amendment, and that the common law was continuously changing, even when 
the Amendment was adopted.279 The Court emphasized that the procedures of 
demurrer to the evidence and the new trial were inconsistent, and that 
differences between the common law procedures and the modern directed 
verdict were inconsequential.280 
The Supreme Court also failed to recognize the authority of the jury in 
relationship to traditional actors in shifting authority from the jury to the 
executive in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. There, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the Seventh Amendment applied in circumstances in 
which Congress had established an executive agency to investigate and 
determine whether employers or employees engaged in unfair labor 
practices.281 The NLRB—the agency—had ordered the employer to pay 
monetary damages to employees as the result of unfair labor practices by the 
employer.282 The employer argued that a jury should decide the damages 
issue.283 Labeling the proceeding as “statutory,” the Supreme Court said that 
the matter was not a common law suit under the Seventh Amendment.284 
Because Congress established this claim, there was no jury trial right.285 The 
Court failed to discuss the authority of the jury to decide damages, any related 
inability of the legislature itself to decide who determines damages, and the 
shift of authority from the jury to the executive. 
Finally, “nonincorporation” of the civil and grand jury provisions 
demonstrates how the Court has shifted power from the jury to the states. In 
1916 and 1884, respectively, the Supreme Court decided not to incorporate the 
Seventh Amendment civil jury provision and the Fifth Amendment grand jury 
clause against the states.286 When the Court did so, these cases were consistent 
with the other Supreme Court jurisprudence on whether parts of the Bill of 
Rights should be incorporated. Subsequently, the Court changed its decisions 
on the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, most recently in 2010 when it 
required states to recognize the Second Amendment right to bear arms.287 
However, the Court has not acted similarly to require states to recognize the 
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civil jury and the grand jury provisions under the Seventh and Fifth 
Amendments, respectively.288 
4. The Missing Branch in the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court presently does not acknowledge the jury’s 
independent constitutional function and its role to check the powers of the 
traditional actors. On the other hand, the Court recognizes the traditional 
actors’ independent constitutional functions to restrain one another through the 
use of the doctrines of separation of powers and federalism. Scholars and the 
Court generally agree that these doctrines are essential to the proper 
functioning of the government. The absence of doctrine affirming the jury’s 
relative independent constitutional role plus the historical transfer of authority 
from the jury to the traditional actors suggest one conclusion: depriving the 
jury of its proper equal status—effectively as a branch or constitutional 
actor—among the traditional actors has contributed to its decline and its loss 
of power to the traditional actors. 
The closest reference to the jury as a branch or constitutional actor is in the 
context of the grand jury. The Supreme Court has referred to the grand jury as 
“a constitutional fixture in its own right,”289 “belong[ing] to no branch of the 
institutional Government,”290 but instead, independent of them. In somewhat 
similar fashion, as previously mentioned, in a decision granting the criminal 
jury power, the Court described it as “a fundamental reservation of power in 
our constitutional structure.”291 But, such designations by the Court are sparse, 
and some have been rejected by the Court in later decisions.292 
Nonetheless, several scholars have recognized that the jury holds an 
important, branch-like role in the government. Notably, Akhil Amar has 
identified the jury as an important part of the constitutional structure.293 As he 
describes it, “The dominant strategy [of the Constitution] to keep agents of the 
central government under control was to use the populist and local institution 
of the jury.”294 The jury helped balance two of the branches; the grand jury 
counterbalanced prosecutors in the executive branch, while the civil jury 
equalized judges in the judicial branch.295 In these roles, juries could, for 
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example, check abuses by the executive and determine compensation for 
people when the government took their property.296 Juries also provided 
knowledge about the government to jurors.297 Another scholar, Nancy Marder, 
has affirmatively referred to the jury as “a coordinate branch of government” 
that checks all of the branches.298 
Others have also emphasized a significant role for grand, criminal and 
civil juries to check the government. Roger Fairfax stated, “[T]he grand jury is 
its own constitutional entity, which checks each of the three branches of 
government.”299 The grand jury is a barrier that must be crossed before the 
judge sentences a criminal defendant.300 Similar to its role to check the 
judiciary, the grand jury can act as a restraint on the executive by preventing it 
from proceeding with a prosecution.301 It can also act as a check on the 
legislature by refusing to indict on a particular charge out of disagreement with 
a law.302 Finally, local citizens can act against the federal government through 
their roles on the grand jury checking federal laws.303  
Rachel Barkow has described the criminal jury as a check on the executive 
and the legislature due to its ability to nullify prosecutions or laws.304 She has 
also described the criminal jury as possessing powers similar to the traditional 
actors, to act and not act.305 Barkow stated that “The constitutional system of 
criminal justice protects the discretionary judgments of all key actors not to 
proceed criminally. That is why the executive has discretionary pardon and 
charging power, why the legislature has the freedom not to criminalize 
conduct, and the jury has the unreviewable power to acquit.”306  
Randolph Jonakait has depicted the civil jury as serving the same function 
as the criminal jury—“as a check on the government,” and also referred to the 
civil jury as a check on “the powerful,” public or private.307 Renée Lettow 
Lerner similarly has discussed the civil jury as a political institution with the 
purpose of checking the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.308  
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a. Right to Jury Trial Versus Power of Jury 
Despite these perspectives, the Supreme Court considers the jury neither 
an independent powerful actor nor a check on the governmental structure. As 
described previously, while the Court originally recognized that the jury 
occupied this important position, over time it has become less enamored with 
the jury. The jury is now viewed only in terms of a right to a jury—relevant 
only when a party chooses to have their case decided by a jury. For example, a 
criminal defendant can simply waive his jury trial right, and a judge can try the 
case, or the defendant can plead guilty and in turn receive a lesser sentence.  
Under this view, the jury may not have fallen so much as it is merely an 
individual right that does not always exist and that plaintiffs and defendants 
can waive. Moreover, in some circumstances, because no right may exist, the 
jury may not fall. For example, courts believe there is no jury right in civil 
cases when a judge decides no reasonable jury could find for one party.  
But constitutional text and evidence present a different perspective. The 
Fifth Amendment states a person cannot be convicted for serious crimes 
(“capital, or otherwise infamous”) without a presentment or indictment by a 
grand jury unless special specific circumstances arise.309 There is no reference 
to a “right” to jury trial in the Amendment, and it gives the grand jury alone 
(absent the stated special circumstances) the power to initiate proceedings 
against defendants accused of serious crimes.310 No other constitutional text 
provides the executive, judges, or any other traditional actor authority to 
initiate a proceeding against defendants accused of serious crimes.  
James Wilson acknowledged the power of the grand jury to both bring 
presentments of its own accord and act on charges brought by the 
prosecutor.311 He discussed this as “the right” and “the duty” of the grand jury 
to act “diligently” and “present truly.”312 He also emphasized the great power 
of the jury in comparison to the judiciary.313 
Like the Fifth Amendment grand jury provision, Article III gives the jury 
affirmative authority.314 It grants the jury power to try all crimes except 
impeachment cases.315 The Sixth Amendment, however, refers to a right—
“the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury” in the area where 
the crime was committed.316 So, the question becomes what power, if any, 
does the jury possess given the use of the term “right” in the Sixth 
Amendment? More specifically, does “right” in the Sixth Amendment limit 
the power of the criminal jury in Article III? There is no evidence that the 
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Sixth Amendment limits or qualifies the jury power set forth in Article III. 
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment, other rights in the Bill of Rights, and the 
original Constitution do not grant authority to any institution other than the 
jury to try crimes (outside of impeachment).  
At the time of the founding, language describing the criminal jury also 
referred or related to power. For example, James Wilson specifically described 
the criminal jury as “[a] man, or a body of men, habitually clothed with a 
power over the lives of their fellow citizens[.]”317 The Federal Farmer also 
acknowledged the power of people on juries. Few could be elected to the 
legislature but they could be part of juries.318 Both provided “their true 
proportion of influence.”319 “Their situation, as jurors and representatives, 
enables them to acquire information and knowledge in the affairs and 
government of the society; and to come forward, in turn, as the centinels and 
guardians of each other.”320  
The civil jury under the Seventh Amendment—unlike the grand jury under 
the Fifth Amendment and the criminal jury under Article III—denotes a 
“right” of trial by jury.321 However, evidence at the founding does not show a 
difference in the discussion of the roles of the three juries. At the time of the 
Constitution’s original enactment, many people had also wanted a guarantee of 
a civil jury trial.322 Moreover, there is evidence that the intentions for the civil 
jury trial were similar to the intentions for the jury trial for crimes—i.e., to 
check the government.323 Add to this, in the time between the Constitution’s 
enactment and the enactment of the Bill of Rights, there is no evidence that 
intentions regarding the civil jury trial changed. This suggests that the “right” 
in the Seventh Amendment does not limit power granted to the civil jury.  
The text of the Seventh Amendment further informs the meaning to be 
given to the civil jury trial. The text refers to the preservation of the right in 
suits at common law.324 At common law, almost invariably juries heard cases 
in which monetary damages were alleged.325 So the text suggests that juries 
were to continue to hear such cases. Also, the text states the specific 
conditions under which judges can be involved once a jury tries a case—thus 
setting forth limitations on the power of the judiciary as well as the authority 
of other traditional actors, which are granted no power at all.  
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At times, the founders referred to the civil jury’s power in a similar 
manner to the grand and criminal juries. Discussing the civil jury trial, the 
Federal Farmer, an Anti-Federalist, emphasized the importance of the jury as 
an institution through which the people could be educated and by which the 
people could exercise power to protect rights.326 He wrote that, “The body of 
the people, principally, bear the burdens of the community; they of right ought 
to have a controul [sic] in its important concerns, both in making and 
executing the laws . . . .”327 The legislature and the jury “are the means by 
which the people are let into the knowledge of public affairs—are enabled to 
stand as the guardians of each others rights, and to restrain, by regular and 
legal measures, those who otherwise might infringe upon them.”328 
There is, however, some evidence that the civil jury amendment provided 
a right rather than a power. For example, when Massachusetts ratified the 
Constitution, it recommended “[i]n civil actions between citizens of different 
States, every issue of fact arising in actions at common law, shall be tried by a 
jury, if the parties, or either of them, request it.”329 
Even if the Seventh Amendment created only a right that can be waived, in 
some circumstances, no waiver of the right occurs, and power shifts from the 
civil jury to traditional actors. The traditional actor affirmatively acts to usurp 
power that the jury previously held, such as when a judge decides a case on 
summary judgment or reduces a jury verdict after a jury trial through the use 
of remittitur, procedures that did not exist at English common law.330 Thus, 
although the Seventh Amendment’s text denotes a “right,” it nonetheless 
establishes the jury’s power to decide certain cases and issues, in relationship 
to the traditional actors’ corresponding limited powers. 
To serve the role that it is supposed to play as a check on the power of the 
traditional actors, the jury itself must possess power. For example, through its 
choice of charges under the law, the executive can threaten a criminal 
defendant with more significant penalties to incentivize the defendant to waive 
the jury trial. Without any recognition of corresponding jury authority, these 
actions of the legislature and the executive go unchecked. As another example, 
a federal judge can dismiss a case seeking civil remedies from a jury for a 
federal officer’s improper search of an individual’s home. Again, without any 
recognition of corresponding authority in the jury to decide the case, the 
government’s effort to stymie the constitutional check of its power goes 
unexamined. 
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b. Other Arguments Against the Jury as a Branch 
In addition to the argument that the jury holds no separate power, other 
arguments can be made against the jury as an independent body. Many regard 
the jury as solely part of the judicial branch and thus related to the judiciary 
alone. The founders made many references to the jury as part of the judicial 
branch. For example, James Wilson stated that the people retained “part of the 
judicial authority” through its power to decide criminal cases.331 Also, as 
previously described, some scholars believe the jury is part of some or all of 
the branches.332  
This Article does not argue that the jury has never been characterized as 
part of a branch. It asserts that regardless of such descriptions, the 
constitutional text and other evidence show an independent, interrelated 
relationship between the jury and the traditional actors, similar to the 
relationship among the traditional actors, to the extent that the jury is 
functionally a branch with significant authority like the traditional actors. 
A final argument against the jury as a branch is the criminal, civil, and 
grand juries are very different entities that cannot be grouped together as one 
branch or constitutional actor. But ascribing “branch” to the grand, criminal, 
and civil juries is not to aggregate them as indistinguishable. Instead, the 
reference to the jury as a branch is simply to describe a common history of 
diminution in power, the similar roles each was to play in opposition to the 
traditional actors, and the comparable reason for the declines of each.  
Alexis de Tocqueville supported the view of the jury as a separate 
independent actor. In the early nineteenth century, after the adoption of the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights, Tocqueville characterized the jury as its own 
independent body.333 He referred to both criminal and civil juries as “before 
all else a political institution.”334 In fact, he distinguished the role of the jury 
as a judicial institution—its role in trials—from its political role.335 In 
discussing the importance of the political role of the jury, he equated its 
importance to voting.336 He stated, “the institution of the jury puts the people 
themselves, or at least a class of citizens, on the judge’s bench. So the 
institution of the jury really puts the leadership of society into the hands of the 
people or of this class.”337 Similar to some others previously mentioned, 
Tocqueville believed that the importance of the jury was particularly important 
to those on the jury.338 “I do not know if the jury is useful to those who have 
                                                                                                                     
 331 2 WILSON, supra note 127, at 1008.  
 332 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 293; MARDER, supra note 31, at 11. 
 333 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 444 (Eduardo Nolla ed., 
James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2010) (1835). 
 334 See id. 
 335 Id. 
 336 See id. at 445. 
 337 Id.  
 338 See id. at 448. 
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legal proceedings, but I am sure that it is very useful to those who judge them. 
I regard it as one of the most effective means that a society can use for the 
education of the people.”339 This view of the jury, as well as the view of the 
jury as a check on the traditional actors, has been lost. 
So, why has the jury declined in authority? Comparison of the jury to the 
traditional actors provides insight. The Constitution grants authority to the 
traditional actors, as well as to the criminal, civil, and grand juries. Through 
the use of the doctrines of separation of powers and federalism, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that the traditional actors possess significant 
authority and are restrained by important limitations. Their power under this 
regime is evident. The President carries out activities. The legislature makes 
laws. Courts issue opinions. And states enact laws and carry out other 
activities. No significant decline in the authority of any of the traditional actors 
from the founding to the present time has been recognized—outside of a 
debated decline in state authority.340 
The traditional actors’ status contrasts with the jury’s status. The jury is 
not considered to have power as a part of the constitutional structure or 
government. It hears few cases, and when it tries a case, its authority can be 
usurped. The similarities between the traditional actors and the jury along with 
the jury’s dissimilar decline show that the failure to give the jury branch-like 
status has contributed to the jury’s decline. While it is difficult to disprove that 
cost, incompetence, inaccuracy, or inefficiency have caused the decline of the 
jury, as mentioned previously, the traditional actors are also criticized for 
having similar characteristics. However, they thrive. 
B. Further Assessing the Decline of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand 
Juries 
As discussed, then, in contrast to its treatment of the traditional actors, the 
Supreme Court has denied the jury doctrine that establishes and protects its 
authority in the constitutional structure. If the jury was prescribed such 
doctrine analogous to separation of powers or federalism, the divisions of 
authority between the jury and the traditional actors could be better assured. 
So why have the traditional actors not recognized the jury as part of the 
constitutional structure and not established doctrine for it similar to separation 
of powers and federalism? This underlying question is difficult to answer. 
                                                                                                                     
 339 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 333, at 448; see also Vikram David Amar, Jury 
Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 220–21 (1995); 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1105, 1162 (2014). See generally JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW 
JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
(2010); Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics 
of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995).  
 340 See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court and the Decline of State Power, 2 
J.L. & ECON. 175, 176 (1959).  
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Different possibilities persist, including some of the reasons proffered in the 
first part of this Article—for example, democratization of the jury or the rise 
of the administrative state through the establishment of administrative 
agencies. To try to answer this question, a related question first must be 
answered. How were the traditional actors able to take authority from the jury?  
1. Unique Characteristics of the Jury 
The traditional actors can shift power from the jury to themselves because 
of certain characteristics of the jury. While the relationships among the 
traditional actors and between the traditional actors and the jury share some 
qualities, the unique characteristics of the jury can cause its relationships to 
function differently. Using the relationship between the judiciary and the jury 
as an example, the judiciary reviews the authority of the jury, just as it 
examines the power of the traditional actors. When the judiciary hears a case, 
it can compete for authority with traditional actors as it can with the jury. The 
judiciary may need to decide whether it, another traditional actor, or the jury 
has authority with regard to some matter. For example, the federal judiciary 
can decide whether a federal court or a state court hears a case, exercising final 
decisionmaking power as to this question. Also, the judiciary can determine 
whether a congressional act that takes authority from the judiciary is 
unconstitutional and, if it so finds, the law can no longer apply. Moreover, the 
judiciary can determine whether a federal rule authorizing a judge to 
appropriate power from the jury is constitutional and, if so, the rule empowers 
the judge and disempowers the jury. 
In these competitive relationships, the jury differs from the traditional 
actors in ways that contribute to its non-branch-like status and its comparative 
decline. First, the jury cannot sit or otherwise perform without the action of the 
judiciary. The judiciary must constitute the jury before it can act. Contrast this 
with examples of the power of traditional actors to exercise power on their 
own: the legislature enacts laws; the President takes action as the Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy; and states enact legislation. Indeed, the 
judiciary’s review of the power of traditional actors often takes place after a 
traditional actor acts in the first instance. Unlike its authority over the 
traditional actors, the judiciary can prevent the jury from acting at all. No jury 
is convened unless the judiciary facilitates the creation of one. 
The second characteristic of the jury that differs from the traditional actors 
that has contributed to its decline is the significant interrelationship between 
its authority and the judiciary’s. While the jury competes with the judiciary for 
authority like the traditional actors do, in contrast to the traditional actors, the 
judiciary’s reviews of the jury’s power most often involve the judiciary’s 
review of its own competing authority. If the judiciary resolves a question of 
jury authority favorably toward the jury, the judiciary denies itself power.  
Third, unlike the jury, the traditional actors have power to counter 
impingement on their own authority by the judiciary or another actor. When a 
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law is deemed unconstitutional, Congress is not without remedy. It can enact 
another piece of legislation testing the boundaries of its authority. 
Furthermore, the judiciary or another traditional actor may exercise self-
restraint because of the power that the other traditional actors can exercise 
against them. Judges may act in a certain manner because legislators can 
impeach them or increase their salaries. Judges may take certain action 
because the President can promote them. States can influence the other 
traditional actors through voting.341 The legislature can block the executive’s 
choice of judges through filibuster or a vote of no confirmation. The 
legislature also can block the executive’s appointments to the executive 
administrative agencies—for example, the National Labor Relations Board or 
the Consumer Protection Bureau. At the same time, through regulation, the 
executive can attempt to add law that Congress will not pass—for example, 
environmental rules. These interrelationships can affect the actions of the 
traditional actors. An actor may be more reticent to take action against another 
actor when they know the actor can affect them negatively. 
In contrast, the jury has little ability to affect the power of judges or the 
other traditional actors. The criminal jury can nullify through its verdict after a 
judge constitutes the jury and gives the case to the jury. However, under 
modern rules, the judge can still acquit if a jury convicts. Because the jury can 
provide no benefit to the traditional actors that the actors cannot derive on 
their own, the jury also has no implicit effect on the traditional actors’ 
authority against it. No mutual relationship incentivizes the traditional actors 
to aid the jury; for example, Congress has no incentive as a result of its 
relationship with the jury to create legislation granting the jury authority that 
has not been recognized under the Constitution.  
Even if the other traditional actors want to help the jury, they do not have 
the power to fully counter the Supreme Court’s impingement of the jury’s 
authority. Arguably, Congress can legislate a jury trial right for crimes or 
claims that the Court has deemed not to require a jury trial right. But once a 
jury trial right exists, the Court retains significant power to affect that right 
through mechanisms that it deems constitutional. 
At times, the other traditional actors work with the judiciary against jury 
authority instead of helping the jury counter the judiciary. Congress can enact 
criminal statutes with significant mandatory sentences. Prosecutors can use 
those statutes to charge defendants and incentivize pleas. The courts then 
decide whether the pleas are knowing and voluntary. The end result is juries 
are eliminated from the process.  
                                                                                                                     
 341 Herbert Wechsler argued that while scholarship had been focused on the 
distribution of authority to states, the influence of the states on the national government 
through the selection of Congress and the President was actually more important to the 
balance between the states and the federal government under federalism than the particular 
authority distributed to the states. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544 (1954). 
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2. The Supreme Court’s Shifting Opinions of the Jury 
These differences between the jury and the traditional actors provide only 
a partial explanation of why the Court and other traditional actors have not 
acknowledged the jury as part of the constitutional structure and have taken its 
authority. If these were the sole causes of the jury’s decline, the Court or the 
traditional actors would have taken authority from the jury continuously after 
the enactment of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court has 
recognized significant authority in the jury at different times, including in the 
late nineteenth century. As a result, there must be some other reason or reasons 
for the shift in authority to the traditional actors and the decline of the jury.  
Decisions of the Supreme Court first recognizing authority in the jury and 
later shifting authority away from the jury offer reasons for the decline. I have 
found nine circumstances in which the Supreme Court originally granted 
authority to the grand, criminal, or civil jury and later, decided against such 
authority. Some of these shifts have been described in this Article. In these 
decisions illustrated by the symbols in Figure A, the Court recognized 
significant authority in the jury in the late nineteenth century through the early 
twentieth century from 1866 to 1913. 
 
Figure A: Pro-Jury and Anti-Jury Cases, 1866–2007342 
 
 
By the 1930s, the Court had changed its mind and shifted authority from 
the jury to itself and other nonjury tribunals.343 In this specific set of cases, the 
                                                                                                                     
 342 No fill = pro-jury; solid fill = anti-jury. 
 343 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (holding that a grand jury is 
required for an alleged off-base rape), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 
(1987) (holding that a military tribunal can try an alleged off-base sexual assault); Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (holding that a dismissal cannot occur unless “it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that 
would entitle him to relief”), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 
(2007) (adopting a plausibility standard and holding that the previous “no set of facts” 
standard “is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading 
standard”); City of Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436 (1894) (holding that appellate review of 
a trial court denial of motion to set aside a verdict as excessive violates the Seventh 
Amendment), abrogated by Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (holding 
that appellate review of a trial denial of motion to set aside an excessive verdict is 
constitutional); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (holding that the court has no power over 
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trend of shifting authority away from the jury remained consistent from the 
1930s onward except for two times in 1957 and 1969,344 when the Court 
recognized significant authority in the jury, but later changed its mind in 2007 
and 1987, respectively.345  
Commentaries do reveal significant restrictions on jury authority prior to 
the shifts of authority from the jury to the traditional actors that are illustrated 
in Figure A. Scholars have written about constraints on the jury’s authority 
that judges and legislatures have imposed since the founding and have 
emphasized the influence of legal elites. William Nelson has written that 
distrust of juries to find law came with economic development and differences 
in “ethical values and assumptions” among people in states such as 
Massachusetts in the nineteenth century.346 In this time period, states began to 
set aside jury verdicts that judges deemed contrary to the weight of the 
evidence.347 Nelson concluded that “the law came to be a tool by which those 
interest groups that had emerged victorious in the competition for control of 
law-making institutions could seize most of society’s wealth for themselves 
and enforce their seizure upon the losers.”348  
                                                                                                                     
a criminal defendant who was prosecuted under a grand jury indictment that was amended 
without grand jury approval), overruled by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) 
(holding that a defect in the indictment did not deprive the court of power over the 
defendant). Compare Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913) (holding that once 
a judge finds that the evidence is insufficient, only a new trial can be ordered), with Balt. & 
Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) (holding, instead, that once a judge finds 
insufficient evidence, a dismissal on the merits may be issued); Thompson v. Utah, 170 
U.S. 343 (1898) (holding that the defendant cannot waive a jury of twelve), overruled by 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), with Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 
(1930) (holding that a defendant can waive a jury and instead, a judge can decide guilt), 
abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that twelve jurors are not 
required); American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897) (holding that unanimity is a 
constitutional hurdle to a conviction), with Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) 
(holding that the unanimity requirement applies only to federal courts); Ex parte Milligan, 
71 U.S. 2 (1866) (supporting juries for citizens and noncitizens), with Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that a noncitizen and an apparent nonmilitary citizen is subject to a 
military tribunal).  
 344 See O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 274 (holding that a grand jury is required for an 
alleged off-base rape in 1969); Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (holding that dismissal cannot 
occur unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim that would entitle him to relief” in 1957). 
 345 See Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 562–63 (adopting plausibility standard and holding 
that the previous “no set of facts” standard “is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative 
gloss on an accepted pleading standard” in 2007); Solorio, 483 U.S. at 440–41 (holding 
that a military tribunal can try an alleged off-base sexual assault in 1987). 
 346 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 165–66 (1975). 
 347 Id. at 170. 
 348 Id. at 174. Juries continued to have some ability to find the law and fact in criminal 
cases. See id. at 257 n.37. 
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Morton Horwitz also wrote that “judges regularly set aside jury verdicts as 
contrary to law.”349 They also began to characterize other matters as “matters 
of law,” on which they could rule.350 This included ordering new trials for jury 
decisions they deemed contrary to the weight of the evidence.351 State 
legislatures also removed some damages issues from the jury’s purview.352 
Horwitz wrote about the alliance between the bar and corporate interests as 
well as the alliance between the bar and the judiciary in this period.353 He 
stated that a measure of the alliance was the “swiftness with which the power 
of the jury [was] curtailed after 1790.”354 This was accomplished through the 
use of procedures that gave judges authority to decide questions that 
effectively took the cases away from the jury.355 Horwitz wrote about the 
growing relationship between judges and companies and stated, “One of the 
great American transformations in the relations between judge and jury arose 
out of marine insurance cases at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when 
courts forged new procedural weapons that enabled them to reverse damage 
awards by juries.”356 
Consistent with these views, in the first period from 1866 to 1913 in 
Figure A357 when the Court decided several cases in favor of jury authority, 
there were also some cases in which the Court did not favor jury authority. For 
example, the Court decided several cases that supported the judge’s power to 
direct the jury to find in a certain way if the judge thought the evidence 
supported that decision.358 In this period, the Court also decided that juries 
could not find law.359  
In the period from 1930 to 2007, when we see the Court decide several 
cases that disfavor jury authority, there were also other cases that favored jury 
authority. The so-called four horsemen, known for their conservative 
decisions, even decided cases that granted authority to the jury at times. Barry 
Cushman points out, however, that it could have been to support the corporate 
greed of defendants who committed crimes.360 Additional examples of cases 
favoring jury authority in the period from 1930 to 2007 include a recent series 
of criminal cases about fact-finding for sentencing.361  
                                                                                                                     
 349 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 28 
(1977). 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. at 29. 
 352 Id. 
 353 See id. at 141–43. 
 354 Id. at 141. 
 355 HORWITZ, supra note 349, at 141–43. 
 356 Id. at 228. 
 357 See infra Figure A. 
 358 See Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 369 (1913).  
 359 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 65, 74, 106 (1895).  
 360 Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 579–
80 (1997).  
 361 See supra text accompanying notes 223–25. 
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The Supreme Court’s historical treatment of the jury clearly varies with 
some decisions in favor and against jury authority in the nineteenth century 
and some decisions in favor and against jury authority in the twentieth century. 
With this said, examining decisions in which the Court changed its view of the 
jury’s authority and reviewing the associated time periods reveals some 
information on why the jury has declined over time. 
In the decisions discussed above in which authority changed from pro-jury 
to anti-jury, the Court altered its characterization and corresponding treatment 
of the jury to deny it an essential role in government. In these cases, the Court 
proffered different reasons for the changes—none of which is sufficiently 
explanatory. It said that a previous case contained only dicta on an issue.362 It 
also overruled decisions.363 And it asserted that the facts encompassed by a 
past case were different from the ones in the case at hand.364  
3. Public Opinion About the Jury 
Information on why the shift against jury authority occurred may be 
derived from public articles written in the time period when the Supreme 
Court changed its mind. There is much scholarly literature on how the 
Supreme Court reacts to public opinion. Barry Friedman has argued that the 
Supreme Court is influenced by public opinion.365 Studying this influence, 
Epstein and Martin stated, “What is surprising is that even after taking into 
account ideology, Public Mood continues to be a statistically significant and 
seemingly non-trivial predictor of outcomes . . . .”366 “When the ‘mood of the 
public’ is liberal (conservative), the Court is significantly more likely to issue 
liberal (conservative) decisions.”367  
                                                                                                                     
 362 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 408–09 & n.4 (1972) (citing negatively Am. 
Publ’g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897)); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90–92 (1970) 
(regarding Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898)); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 
293 (1930) (regarding Thompson, 170 U.S. 343), abrogated by Williams, 399 U.S. 78.  
 363 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987); cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 
(2007) (discussing and abandoning the standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); 
Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 661 (1935) (limiting the holding of 
Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913), to that particular case). 
 364 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1942) (discussing Ex parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. 2 (1866)); Redman, 295 U.S. at 657–58 (discussing Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 
U.S. 364 (1913)).  
 365 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 
(2009) (“Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment of the 
American people.”).  
 366 Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme 
Court? Possibly Yes (but We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 279 (2010).  
 367 Id. at 263. 
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They do not know why.368 It could be that the Court is following public 
opinion or, as members of the public, their opinions are similarly affected.369 
They conclude that there is some association between public opinion and the 
decisions of the Court but cannot say definitely whether public mood 
influences decisions.370 Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins add to this literature 
through their argument that the Court is more influenced by legal elites than 
by the public.371 
Accepting that public opinion influences the Court, I analyzed public 
opinion in the time period surrounding the cases that were decided when the 
Supreme Court recognized jury authority (1866–1913) and when it began to 
change its decisions to not recognize such authority (1930–1942). I reviewed 
New York Times articles from 1851 (the date when The New York Times was 
established)372 to 1945 to encompass a time period before and after the time 
period in question. I specifically examined the articles that contained the term 
“juries.” The New York Times has been intended to appeal to a more cultured, 
intellectual readership,373 and thus these articles present information about 
public sentiment—though often the elite public sentiment—about the jury at 
the time. Indeed, this elite public sentiment could be different than public 
sentiment more generally. 
The articles revealed much information regarding the jury, much of which 
is consistent with Nelson and Horwitz’s opinions. Beliefs about the jury were 
mixed. From the 1850s, criticism of the criminal, civil, and grand juries 
abounded. The jury was said to be too sympathetic, swayed by emotion. It was 
too easy on criminals.374 Some complained that grand juries would not find an 
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 369 Id. at 264. 
 370 Id. at 280–81. 
 371 See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, 
Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010).  
 372 Our History, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytco.com/who-we-are/culture/our-history/#1 
835-1880 [https://perma.cc/4UFV-7BTP]. 
 373 See The New York Times, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-New-York-Times [https://perma.cc/FUL3-PE9G] 
(last updated Apr. 21, 2015). See generally SUSAN E. TIFFT & ALEX S. JONES, THE TRUST: 
THE PRIVATE AND POWERFUL FAMILY BEHIND THE NEW YORK TIMES (1999) (documenting 
the history of the two families that have owned The New York Times for over a century and 
the development of the paper itself). 
 374 A correspondent for the Cincinnati Gazette criticized the result of a Cincinnati 
criminal case decided by a jury by stating that:  
[T]he passions, prejudices and sympathies of the jury are clearly studied and brought 
to influence the decision; all the resources of eloquence and of ingenuity are 
exhausted in the endeavor, not to clear up obscurities and ascertain the truth, but to 
swerve the minds of the jury, and induce them to render a verdict, in violation of their 
oath, on other grounds than those of fact—on grounds of prejudice, of sympathy, or of 
some other sentiment, honorable and just it may be, but utterly out of place in a 
judicial determination of matters of fact. 
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indictment when a person was guilty.375 New York juries were referred to as 
“an infallible protection of lawlessness and license,”376 and people who 
avoided jury service were blamed for this situation.377 Moreover, workingmen 
were criticized as not having the qualifications to serve as jurors, and 
businessmen were viewed as the best jurors.378  
In the wake of such criticism, efforts to reform the jury were attempted. 
These attempts included broadening the membership of the jury to include 
more businessmen by taking away exemptions and discouraging bribery to 
avoid service,379 not requiring unanimity, which “puts it in the power of one 
stupid or prejudiced person to block the course of justice altogether,”380 and 
eliminating cast-iron jurymen, who were controlled by officials who chose 
them.381  
Not only were juries criticized. Judges were called corrupt.382 In this 
arena, the jury was recognized as the best method for resolving disputes. One 
article described the jury in the following manner: “At its best estate, trial by 
jury is only tolerable because no better way of approximating to the truth of 
guilt, or innocence, has been invented. That it abounds with defects, and 
results too frequently in serious injustice, is the experience and opinion of the 
highest legal authorities.”383  
                                                                                                                     
Criminal Trials, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, May 5, 1854, at 4 (emphasis omitted); see also 
Charge to a Grand Jury by a Philadelphia Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1869, at 5 (“It is 
time that the bad should be made to feel the power of the law.”); Sympathy for Criminals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1858, at 4. 
 375 See The Courts and the People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1871, at 4; The Grand Jury 
Investigating the City Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1871, at 8.  
 376 Our Juries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1873, at 4. 
 377 Id.; see Civis, Letter to the Editor, The Ethics of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
1873; Henry L. Clinton, Letter to the Editor, Law Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1872, at 
5.  
 378 See Service on Juries, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1867, at 4; The Jury System and Its 
Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1867, at 4 (discussing the cost of repeated criminal trials 
when juries disagree and the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently knowledgeable jurors for 
civil cases). 
 379 Working of the New Jury Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1870, at 3. 
 380 Trial By Jury, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1871, at 4. 
 381 For many years in the federal courts, the officials who selected jurors (who were 
thus able to give them pay) controlled them; the same people were selected time and time 
again for grand and criminal juries. The jurors were referred to as “cast-iron jurymen.” Our 
Jury System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1873, at 4. While this changed, at times, criticisms were 
lodged that the same type of corruption continued to occur in certain cases. See id.; see also 
Cast Iron Juries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1860, at 4; Juries in the Federal Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1867, at 4.  
 382 See “Let Him Go,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1871, at 4.  
 383 Disagreeing Juries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1856, at 4; see How to Stop the Slave-
Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1858, at 4 (recognizing that juries would not convict slave-
dealers but that “it does, in the long run, and on the whole, more good and less harm than 
any other system that has ever been devised, and we can only improve it by improving the 
public itself”); Sentence of Another Slave-Trader, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1862, at 4 
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Around this time, Wisconsin abolished grand juries, and Justice Miller of 
the United States Supreme Court criticized this action.384 He stated “that, 
could the fathers of this Republic see today the Grand Jury abolished, they 
would think us a very degraded people.”385  
The late nineteenth century brought more reasons to fault the jury. 
Railway ticket scalpers asserted that they did not fear the law because at least 
one juror would “refuse to allow wrong to be done.”386 An African-American 
congressman proposed a bill to have the federal courts try those accused of 
lynchings because southern juries would not convict.387 In this period there 
were also complaints from labor organizations that workingmen were not 
selected for grand juries and that the people “selected represented wealth or 
property.”388 
A general confidence in the jury system nonetheless persisted. In the late 
nineteenth century, Joseph Choate, the president of the American Bar 
Association, gave a speech before the ABA that extolled the virtues of the jury 
system and its immortality.389 He said: 
[H]e had no fears for the safety of the jury system in this country. The 
“learned essayists and philosophers,” whom he described as its enemies [who 
describe the jury as “rotten” and “out of date”], are never likely to become 
numerous or powerful enough to menace its existence. All the evils of the 
system are in the practice, not in the principle of it, and these are trivial, 
indeed, as compared with its benefits.390  
Around this same time period, a call for reform from the business 
community received praise. “It is an extremely encouraging sign that the 
scheme for securing jury reform is being taken up by the Chamber of 
Commerce and other business organizations.”391 The Chamber represented 
those who were “deeply interested in good juries and that suffer most from the 
present imperfect and unequal system for obtaining juries.”392 The article 
insisted that juries should be populated with these classes of people because of 
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 386 Scalpers and Juries, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1897, at 6. 
 387 The Trial of Lynchers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1899, at 2. 
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their intelligence, experience, and responsibility.393 Special juries, which 
included people selected for their intelligence and experience, were established 
in New York in this time period, and later were criticized as intended to 
convict.394 
In the early twentieth century, sentiments toward the jury remained mixed. 
Judge O’Sullivan of a New York state court spoke of his change of mind from 
observing juries over time, that though the system could be improved, juries 
should be trusted in both criminal and civil cases.395 On the other hand, others, 
including some lawyers, continued to distrust juries.396 Civil juries could hold 
prejudice against corporations.397 One former juror wrote that the jurors on the 
jury on which he sat expressed opinions that the corporation should pay 
regardless of its fault and that judges were biased in favor of the corporations 
so their instructions should be ignored.398 At the same time, there were 
allegations that jurors and judges were paid by corporations to find in their 
favor.399 Criminal juries likewise could be biased. In the opinion of the former 
attorney general of Massachusetts, criminals in Boston did not fear conviction 
because juries could be bribed.400 Moreover, southern juries might not convict 
someone of murder of an African-American because of bribery or 
friendship.401 Around this time period, at a meeting of the Committee on Law 
Enforcement of the American Bar Association, American juries were criticized 
as too lenient on crime, in comparison to juries in England and Canada.402 It 
was said that in most areas of the country, in capital cases, juries included “a 
large proportion of sentimental or imbecile jurymen.”403 And as a result, 
changes in the composition of juries were advocated.404  
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In the late 1920s, the intensity of the criticism of the jury increased. Public 
officials spoke affirmatively in favor of a shift in authority from juries to 
judges to promote justice and democracy. In 1928, at a meeting of the New 
York branch of the Federal Bar Association, Charles Evans Hughes, a former 
and future United States Supreme Court Justice, advocated greater power for 
judges and diminished authority for juries:405  
Our hope for the progress of the administration of justice . . . lies not 
with juries, but with conscientious, able, industrious judges in the control of 
the business of their courts. Give the judge all the power he has and more, 
too. Of course, you must have able, conscientious men on the bench, but you 
will not get better judges by curtailing their functions and making them mere 
moderators of juries.406 
He urged “[g]et[ting] rid of jury trials as much as possible” and said, “Often it 
is almost impossible to get a satisfactory one.”407 He called “the judge, the 
best servant in our democracy.”408 Fifteen years earlier Justice Hughes was 
one of the Justices in dissent in Slocum, one of the last significant pro-jury 
cases. Thus, he had earlier been against jury authority and now publicly 
expressed why: that the judge was the better decision maker.  
The toastmaster of the event in which Hughes spoke, the United States 
Attorney, Charles H. Tuttle, echoed Hughes’s comments, recommending that 
Congress pass legislation passing more authority from the jury to the judge.409 
While Tuttle discussed independent investigation by the grand jury, he also 
suggested that minor felonies should not require a grand jury indictment.410 
The fact that Hughes and Tuttle held significant authority respectively in the 
Supreme Court and in the executive, in addition to their obvious authority by 
their selection to address the New York branch of the Federal Bar Association, 
suggests that their anti-jury attitudes were not uncommon among other 
influential members of the bar. Hughes’s previous election as the President of 
the American Bar Association in 1925 also suggests that his views may have 
been common to the legal community.411  
In this same time period, a lawyer gave a speech in favor of “retention of 
the jury system,” because “without it the United States would become 
corrupt.”412 This speech arguing for keeping the jury shows that there was a 
strong tide occurring against jury power. This same year, Justice McCook of 
the New York state courts advocated judges over juries: 
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The jury is far from an efficient body, and never can be made 
so . . . . Also, a Judge should be preferred to a jury because of the time saved 
to the public and to the citizen compelled to serve. The jury represents 
democracy applied to legal problems. Of these it often makes a mess, just as 
the voters often do of political problems.413 
Again, that this justice advocated publicly against jury authority and in favor 
of his own authority suggests that there was significant sentiment against the 
jury in important circles. 
In this time frame, there is evidence that the jury acted against the law. 
Through the jury, the community was said to react against harsh sentences for 
violations of liquor laws, with decisions to acquit or verdicts of guilt of a 
lesser charge.414 At the same time, the business community continued to push 
for reform. The Merchants’ Association released statistics that showed “clerks 
and salesmen predominate on the juries of New York County, and that 
merchants, bankers and manufacturers rarely are talesmen.”415 It asserted more 
convictions for crimes would occur if more executives served.416 The 
importance of juries to companies is further demonstrated by Macy’s decision 
to pay its employees while they served on juries.417 The Executive Vice 
President of Macy’s explained that 
“[t]he Merchants’ Association report reveals that from one-half to two-
thirds of those drawn for jury duty in 1927 successfully evaded it . . . . This 
unwillingness on the part of a class best qualified to serve [merchants, 
bankers, and manufacturers] interferes seriously with the administration of 
justice in our courts.”418  
Some years later in the 1930s, past concern that juries would be biased 
against business persisted. An article discussed the increase in car insurance 
premiums because juries rendered “sympathetic and excessive verdicts.”419 
Also elsewhere there was continued reference to “[i]f we are to retain the 
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jury,” an intimation that there continued to be opinion expressed that juries 
should decide fewer cases.420  
At the same time that juries were criticized because they did not include 
sufficient businessmen, juries became more diverse in other ways. While 
African-Americans and women had served on juries in some parts of the 
country in the past, the rights of these groups became firmer in this period. The 
right of women to serve on juries was debated and upheld in certain 
localities.421 The Supreme Court also decided that African-Americans could 
not be excluded from juries based on race or color.422  
In the 1940s, different interest groups continued their efforts to diversify 
the jury by eliminating exemptions423 and to include more women and 
African-Americans. However, judges had significant discretion to choose 
jurors.424 During the war, when many men were away, it became more 
difficult to find jurors deemed qualified.425 And in some places, only four 
jurors sat in civil cases.426 At the same time, blue-ribbon juries—
“generally . . . drawn from a social and economic class different from that of 
the accused”—continued to be criticized as insufficiently representative of the 
community.427  
While grand juries continued to serve important roles, for example in one 
instance issuing a report regarding bribery by public officials that involved the 
construction industry,428 criticisms persisted, including allegations that the 
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grand jury failed to indict when it should.429 A measure to give juries 
additional power to recommend life sentences in all first-degree murder cases 
in New York carried few votes.430 One legislator stated that the jury “would 
‘pass the buck’” and judges would join in this recommendation.431  
There was further emphasis that judges could better decide cases than 
jurors. “[A] judge, at worst, is apt to be more often right than a jury, and the 
poison of politics is a thing of the past, or almost so. It is not as much to be 
feared as bias among jurymen, especially in these times.”432 Also, in this time 
period, the selection of jurors in the United States was referred to as “so often” 
“the long farce” and was unfavorably compared to the proper selection of 
jurors in England.433  
The articles reviewed here do not discuss the executive. At the time, the 
executive aided by the legislature also demonstrated a desire to shift matters 
from the jury to other tribunals over which it had control. These shifts coincide 
with the beginning of the rise of the administrative state around the time of the 
New Deal in the 1930s.434 For example, on the labor side, Congress gave 
authority to the executive agency of the National Labor Relations Board to 
decide certain damages issues that arguably juries instead had authority to 
decide. 
The articles reveal growing resistance to the jury’s authority over time. 
The public statements of judges against jury authority and in favor of judicial 
authority in the late 1920s coincide with the shift in the case law against jury 
authority in the 1930s, illustrated in Figure A.435 Moreover, criticisms that the 
jury did not include sufficient businessmen occurred around this time period, 
as did legislative efforts to include businessmen on juries. Also, as the jury 
continued to be more diverse in gender and race, the jury was less desirable to 
judges and corporations. It appears that the legal elites opposed jury authority 
and acted against it, ultimately succeeding in influencing the Supreme 
Court.436 
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These articles are consistent with the theory that over time legal elites and 
corporations sought to shift authority from the jury to the traditional actors. 
For example, in reaction to the Slocum case in which the Supreme Court 
decided that the procedure of judgment notwithstanding the verdict violated 
the Seventh Amendment, a committee of the American Bar Association was 
empanelled to draft federal legislation to permit judges to direct a judgment.437 
Some state legislatures themselves actually enacted such procedures.438 This 
activity culminated in the Redman decision in which the Court changed its 
decision in favor of jury authority to find against jury authority.439 This result 
was praised as consistent with the value of efficiency.440  
The traditional actors led by the Supreme Court have treated the jury 
differently than they have treated each other by denying any place for the jury 
in the constitutional structure. This has shifted jury authority to the traditional 
actors. As discussed here, why this shift has occurred, particularly in the 
1930s, is a difficult question. While many reasons have been offered for the 
decline of the jury, such as the democratization of the jury, the question 
remains why has that “reason” contributed to the fall. For example, why has 
jury authority declined with the democratization of the jury? Previous 
literature, as well as public articles from the time period, reveals that the 
Supreme Court likely has been influenced by legal elites as well as by 
corporations to reduce jury authority over time.441 There have been 
relationships between these actors and all of them have something to gain 
when the jury loses authority. They acquire power.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Over the years, many different reasons have been offered for the declines 
of the criminal, civil, and grand juries, and their falls have not been connected. 
Primarily blamed are their purported incompetency, inaccuracy, inefficiency, 
and cost. The falls have not been associated with the previously unrecognized 
phenomenon of the usurpation by the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, 
and the states of the jury’s authority.  
While the Supreme Court has protected and limited the traditional actors’ 
powers under the doctrines of separation of powers and federalism, it has not 
recognized a similar doctrine to protect and limit the separate power of the 
jury despite similar empowering text in the Constitution and the like intentions 
of the founders of the Constitution and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Instead, the Court has often originally acknowledged the jury’s power, only to 
later redistribute that authority to a traditional actor. Deprived of doctrine 
legitimizing the jury as a separate power, the jury has lost significance with 
each decision in which the Court shifted its authority. This doctrinal void 
along with the jury’s unique characteristics as unable to combat infringements 
on its authority places the jury in a precarious position in the constitutional 
structure. The cause of this treatment of the jury and thus its decline likely 
includes the influence of legal elites and corporations on the Supreme Court. 
This new theory of the jury’s fall requires the debate over the jury to be 
reframed to the role that the traditional actors should play in our government 
in relationship to the role of the people or the jury. 
